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Chapter	11	
Evolutionary	Genetics	and	Cultural	Traits	
in	a	‘Body	of	Theory’	Perspective	
Emanuele	Serrelli	
The	 fact	 that	 methods	 of	 evolutionary	 genetics	 can	 deal	 with	 culture	 and	cultural	traits	has	recently	become	one	argument	to	some	hyper-enthusiastic	claims	that	the	social	sciences	could	be	unified	by	an	evolutionary	approach.1	In	 this	 paper,	 while	 I	 try	 to	 explain	 how	 culture	 is	 indeed	 tractable	 by	evolutionary	 genetics,	 I	 adopt	 a	 less	 pretentious	 attitude.	 The	 basis	 of	 this	attitude	 are	 the	 well-defined	 accumulations	 of	 scientific	 knowledge	 I	 call	
bodies	 of	 theory,	 made	 of	 mathematical	 methods,	 mathematical	 models	 and	painfully	 achieved	 knowledge	 about	 these	 models.	 Bodies	 of	 theory	 are	deposited	 in	 the	 traditions	 of	 the	 sciences	 along	 with	 notions	 and	achievements	 about	 particular	 topics.	 Bodies	 of	 theory,	 whose	 usefulness	depends	on	generality,	get	expanded	over	 time,	and	sometimes	get	modified	to	 study	new	problems,	 new	domains,	where,	 in	 turn,	 they	promote	definite	ways	of	constructing	problems	and	understanding	things.	I	treat	evolutionary	genetics	 as	 a	 body	 of	 theory	 that	 had	 inherited	 and	 radically	 transformed	Darwin’s	way	 of	 thinking	 of	 characters.	 The	 ‘body’	 still	 includes	 long-lasting	mathematical	 tools	 that	 were	 invented	 by	 statisticians	 and	 people	 such	 as	Francis	 Galton	 in	 the	 nineteenth	 century,	 but	 the	 real	 boost	 was	 the	mathematical	 theory	 of	 Mendelian	 populations	 elaborated	 since	 the	 late	1910s.	 In	 the	 1970s,	 evolutionary	 genetics	 was	 pushed	 by	 some	 empirical	problems	 towards	 incorporating	 learned	 –	 or	 “cultural”	 –	 behaviors	 into	 its	matemathical	models,	generating	a	way	of	describing	culture	in	terms	of	traits.																																									 																					1	Connection:	 Note	 that,	 in	 almost	 every	 discipline,	 evolution	 has	 nothing	 to	 do	 with	 the	concept	of	progress.	Refer	to	the	introduction	of	Chapter	3	for	a	commentary	and	further	links.	The	separation	of	evolution	and	progress	is	discussed	at	length,	in	Section	13.3,	with	particular	reference	to	‘cultural	evolution’.	
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Before	 telling	 this	 story	 from	 the	beginning,	 I	 introduce,	with	 a	minimum	of	technicalities,	 the	 encounter	 of	 evolutionary	 genetics	 with	 cultural	transmission.	 In	 the	 end,	 I	will	 argue	 for	 a	humbler	 view	of	 the	 relationship	between	 evolutionary	 genetics	 and	 culture,	 and,	 accordingly,	 for	 a	 less	demanding	epistemology	of	cultural	traits.	
11.1	 What	would	you	Like	for	Breakfast?	Cultural	
Transmission	and	Evolutionary	Genetics	The	 following	 example	 aims	 to	 illustrate	 why,	 in	 the	 1970s,	 a	 scientific	discourse	 started	 to	 emerge	 that	 treated	 things	 like	 the	 lactase	 gene	 and	things	 like	 italian-style	 breakfast	 in	 a	 unified	 way,	 that	 is,	 as	 genetic	 and	cultural	 traits.	The	discourse,	 scaffolded	by	mathematical	modeling,	updated	the	 notion	 of	 ‘characters’	 that	 was	 present	 in	 the	 tradition	 of	 biology	 since	Darwin.	Food	 customs	are	one	of	 the	most	 celebrated	kinds	of	 cultural	differences.	Breakfast,	for	example,	is	highly	variable	across	countries.	Italians	are	known	for	 their	 cult	 of	 coffee,	 cappuccino,	 and	 various	 combinations	 of	 coffee	 and	milk.	 It	 is	 not	 rare	 that	 people	 from	 different	 ethnic,	 linguistic,	 or	 national	groups	 praise	 or	 disapprove	 each	 other	 for	 the	 kind	 of	 food	 or	 cooking	method.	 Fortunately,	 food	 is	 also	 a	matter	 of	 curiosity	 and	 happy	 exchange	and	 cultural	 hybridization.	 In	 sum,	 feeding	 customs	 are	 culture.	 But	what	 if	human	organisms,	more	specifically	adult	people,	were	definitely	partitioned	into	milk-digesting	and	non-milk-digesting	people?	And	what	if	milk-digesting	people	 were	 very	 unevenly	 distributed	 in	 different	 regions	 of	 the	 world?	Could	breakfast	habits	 in	different	 “cultures”	be	affected	by	people’s	varying	capacity	to	digest	milk?	Young	 mammals	 synthesize	 an	 enzyme	 called	 lactase	 that	 hydrolyzes	 the	main	 carbohydrate	 of	 milk,	 lactose,	 into	 glucose	 and	 galactose.	 In	 this	 way	they	 process	 their	 diet	 which	 is	 essentially	 composed	 by	 milk.	 After	 the	weaning,	 mammals	 usually	 reduce	 lactase	 production.	 In	 humans,	 instead,	many	 individuals	 continue	 to	 express	 lactase	 throughout	 adult	 life,	 and	 are	thus	 able	 to	 digest	 the	 lactose	 contained	 in	 fresh	 milk.	 This	 capacity	 –	 as	reported	in	a	recent	survey,	Gerbault	et	al.	(2011)	–	is	called	LP,	standing	for	lactose-persistence.	 LP	 is	 not	 ubiquitous	 in	 humans:	 itP	 varies	 widely	 in	human	 populations,	 both	 between	 and	 within	 continents	 (Figure	 11.1).	 As	Gerbault	et	al.	explain,	“in	lactase	non-persistent	individuals,	the	fermentation	by	 colonic	 bacteria	 and	 osmotic	 effects	 of	 undigested	 lactose	 often	 cause	symptoms	 such	 as	 abdominal	 pain,	 bloating,	 flatulence	 and	 diarrhoea”	(Gerbault	et	al.	2011:	864).	The	exact	genetic	basis	of	the	LP	trait	is	certainly	more	 complex	 than	a	 single	 gene,	 and	 is	 still	 not	 fully	known.2	In	 fact,	 it	 has	been	shown	that	some	individuals	who	aren’t	able	to	synthesize	lactase	can	in	fact	consume	lactose-containing	products	without	any	obvious	ill	effects,	and	changes	 in	 the	composition	of	 the	gut	 flora	–	a	non-genetic	 trait	–	may	be	as	important	as	 the	active	enzyme.	Nonetheless,	 for	 simplicity,	 I	will	 talk	about	the	 “lactase	 gene”.	 One	 of	 the	 amazing	 features	 of	 the	 evolutionary	 genetics																																									 																					2	In	 recent	 years,	 a	 number	 of	 single	 nucleotide	 polymorphisms	 (SNPs)	 have	 been	 found	 in	association	with	 the	 LP	 trait	 in	 different	 populations.	 The	 first	 to	 be	 identified,	 -13910*T,	 is	found	not	in	the	LCT	gene	(the	lactase	gene)	but	within	an	intron	of	a	neighbouring	gene,	MCM6.	This	nucleotide	change	affects	lactase	promoter	activity,	and	the	allele	explains	only	partly	the	distribution	of	LP	(its	frequency	map	does	not	completely	overlap	that	of	LP).	
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body	of	theory	is	just	its	relative	independence	from	the	genetic	details	of	the	considered	trait,	up	to	traits	like	lactose	digestion	that	are	not	reducible	to	any	genetic	character.	
Figure	11.1.	HERE.	Can	 the	 lactase	 gene	 be	 an	 example	 of	 genes	 influencing	 the	 differential	probability	of	assuming	and	keeping	cultural	habits?	Lactose	intolerants	who	are	 able	 to	 blame	 milk	 for	 their	 morning	 nausea,	 and	 who	 lack	 access	 to	chemical	 remedies	 or	 lactose-free	 alternatives	 (e.g.,	 soy	 milk),	 may	 be	reluctant	 to	 adopt	 the	 breakfast	 pattern	 from	 their	 family	 or	 colleagues.	Therefore,	 their	 genotype	 will	 influence	 the	 probability	 distribution	 of	different	 cultural	 alternatives.	On	 the	other	hand,	 there	 is	 the	 issue	of	 social	pressure	 towards	having	breakfast	 in	a	certain	way.	 In	 Italy,	going	 for	coffee	and	pastry	 is	a	very	 important	social	activity,	so	 it	might	turn	out	difficult	 to	avoid	 milk.	 Furthermore,	 family	 habits	 may	 be	 highly	 important	 in	conditioning	 individual	behavior,	making	you	feel	 like	you	would	never	start	your	 day	without	 a	 cup	 of	 fresh	milk	 and	 your	 favorite	 butter	 biscuits	 from	back	 when	 you	 were	 teen.	 Personal	 aversion	 and	 social	 pressure	 to	 milk	consumption,	 with	 their	 respective	 strengths,	 will	 influence	 the	 probability	distribution	 of	 consuming	 milk,	 and	 many	 factors	 will	 eventually	 settle	individuals	 on	 a	 landscape	 of	 alternative	 behavior	 types.	 Settling	 on	 one	alternative	doesn’t	necessarily	mean	a	 life	choice.	Of	course,	 it	 is	possible	for	the	individual	to	choose	a	definitive	stand	on	the	matter,	and	to	drink	always	and	 only	 orange	 juice	 instead	 of	 cappuccino,	 but	 maybe	 the	 individual	 will	choose	from	time	to	time	whether	to	have	latte	or	not,	or	she	will	switch	from	time	to	time	to	stable	solutions	that	are	adequate	to	the	various	periods	of	life.	The	probability	distribution	of	different	cultural	alternatives	aims	to	subsume	and	 synthesize	 all	 those	 individual	 life	 solutions,	 making	 them	 comparable	and	 allowing	 scientists	 (for	 instance,	 medical	 researchers)	 to	 make	 general	considerations	on	breakfast	behavior.	Population	 genetics	 –	 a	 field	 explained	 below	 –	 began	 to	 consider	 these	issues	as	relevant	when	it	was	already	a	mature,	60-years-old	field,	thanks	to	the	work	of	 important	 innovators	such	as	Marcus	Feldman	and	Luca	Cavalli-Sforza.	Population	genetics	 is	a	 fundamental	part	of	evolutionary	biology.	As	the	name	 says,	 it	 deals	with	questions	 about	populations	 and	 their	 genetics:	why	does	the	lactase	gene	occur	at	particular	frequencies	across	populations	of	the	world?	What	populations’	characteristics	are	relevant	to	this	issue?	Population	genetics	considers	a	gene	as	something	that	spreads	and	remains	in	 a	 population	 by	 means	 of	 reproduction	 through	 generations.	 More	precisely,	 population	 genetics	 studies	 the	 fate	 of	 particular	 forms	 of	 genes,	called	alleles,	with	respect	to	alternative	forms	of	the	same	genes.	In	the	case	we	are	considering,	LP	(lactose-persistence)	is	an	allele,	while	its	alternative	is	lactose	intolerance.	The	expansion	or	decline	of	the	LP	allele	in	the	population	depends	on	how	often	and	how	luckily	the	allele	ends	up	into	the	offspring.	LP	has	 been	 a	 lucky	 allele	 in	 some	 populations.	 If	 we	 analyze	 a	 particular	population,	say,	Italians,	and	we	find	that	LP	is	almost	omnipresent	(while	less	frequent	 in	 other	 populations),	 population	 genetics	 will	 guide	 us	 to	 some	historical	 factors	 that	 may	 explain	 why.	 If	 lactose	 intolerance	 has	 been	unlucky	 in	 Italy,	 for	 example,	 the	 reason	might	be	 that	 for	millennia	 Italians	had	been	farming	and	consuming	milk	as	a	primary	element	in	their	diet.	In	a	milk-consuming	population,	the	lactose	intolerance	allele	is	unlucky	because	it	finds	 itself	 in	 individuals	 that,	 on	 average,	 are	 slightly	 sicker	 than	 the	
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population	 mean.	 Therefore,	 lactose	 intolerance	 gets	 transmitted	 less	frequently	due	to	health	problems	of	its	bearers.	In	technical	terms,	in	a	milk-consuming	 population,	 lactose	 intolerance	 has	 a	 lower	 fitness	 than	 LP.	Population	 genetics	 calculates,	 for	 example,	 how	 long	 must	 a	 population	sustain	milk	consumption	in	order	to	erase	the	influence	of	initial	frequencies	of	milk	tolerance	and	intolerance	on	the	current	amount	of	lactose	tolerance;	as	 time	 goes	 by,	 in	 fact,	 the	 influence	 of	 those	 initial	 frequencies	will	 decay.	Other	 dynamics	 such	 as	 rates	 of	 emigration	 and	 immigration	 may	 be	 very	important,	and	are	considered	and	quantified	in	population	genetics.	In	the	1970s,	mathematicians	such	as	Cavalli-Sforza	and	Feldman	found	out	and	understood	that	to	explain	or	predict	the	frequency	of	an	allele	such	as	LP	it	 is	absolutely	 insufficient	 to	characterize	 the	population	as	milk-consuming	or	 not.	 Rather,	 the	 individual	 bearer’s	 behavior	will	 be	 crucial	 to	 determine	how	lucky	the	gene	is.	If	a	lactose	intolerant	person	is,	on	average,	also	milk-aversive,	then	lactose	intolerance	will	be	pretty	as	much	fit	as	milk	tolerance:	the	allele	will	be	lucky	to	end	up	in	a	person	that,	being	intolerant,	decides	to	refrain	 from	consuming	milk.	 In	other	words,	while	 the	 fate	of	 the	allele	still	depends	 on	 how	 frequently	 the	 allele	 ends	 up	 in	 a	 combination	 rather	 than	another,	 it	 is	 the	 gene-behavior	 combination	 that	 has	 a	 fitness.	 And,	 as	 we	have	seen	in	talking	about	breakfast,	when	you	know	whether	a	person	has	a	certain	 gene,	 you	 still	 don’t	 know	 what	 her	 behavior	 will	 be.	 Social	 and	cultural	 pressures	 will	 play	 a	 role.	 In	 a	 milk	 consuming	 population,	 for	example,	for	various	reasons	and	through	all	kinds	of	particular	cases	that	are	not	even	visible	at	the	population	level,	 the	social	pressure	towards	drinking	cappuccino	 for	 breakfast	 might	 be	 very	 low.	 This	 would	 allow	 for	 relative	well-being	of	lactose	intolerance:	people	will	choose	only	with	their	bellyache.	Cavalli-Sforza	 and	 Feldman	 demonstrated	 in	 this	 prototypic	 case	 that	 the	strength	 of	 cultural	 transmission	 in	 a	 population	 is	 a	 crucial	 measure	 to	establish	 sound	 relationships	 between	 genes	 (lactose	 persistence	 and	intolerance),	behavior	(milk	consumption),	their	frequencies	and	their	change	through	 time.	They	also	demonstrated	 that	 social	 and	 cultural	pressures	are	needed	to	explain	the	observed	frequencies	of	LP.	We	 will	 get	 back	 to	 the	 issue	 of	 lactose	 absorption	 later,	 to	 show	 how	powerful	 a	 body	 of	 mathematical	 theory	 can	 be	 in	 resolving	 historical	scenarios.	But	first	we	are	going	to	see	how	the	body	of	theory	of	evolutionary	genetics	came	about	in	the	first	place,	to	appreciate	that	the	value	of	a	body	of	theory	lays	not	only	in	its	modeling	power,	but	also	in	the	amount	of	work	that	has	been	necessary	to	build	it	and	accrue	knowledge	around	it.	
11.2	 The	Historical	Growth	of	a	Body	of	Theory:	
Evolutionary	Genetics	Charles	 Darwin’s	 idea	 of	 a	 character	 was	 foundational	 to	 evolutionary	biology.	 In	 Darwin’s	 Origin	 of	 Species	 (1859),	 the	 character	 got	 early	 and	tightly	 related	 to	 inheritance.3	Darwin	made	 the	 strong	 statement	 that	 “Any	variation	which	 is	 not	 inherited	 is	 unimportant	 for	 us”	 (ivi:	 12),	 and	wrote:	“Perhaps	the	correct	way	of	viewing	the	whole	subject	[of	characters],	would	be,	to	look	at	the	inheritance	of	every	character	whatever	as	the	rule,	and	non-																																								 																					3	Connection:	Darwin's	thoughts,	as	expressed	in	his	writings,	are	protagonist	also	of	Sections	13.3,	16.2,	18.2,	20.3	and	20.4.	
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inheritance	 as	 the	 anomaly”	 (ivi:	 13).	 Due	 to	 the	 “law”	 of	 natural	 selection,	characters	are	so	important	that	they	become	almost	autonomous	phenomena	in	the	evolutionary	process:	Although	 natural	 selection	 can	 act	 only	 through	 and	 for	 the	 good	 of	 each	 being,	 yet	
characters	and	structures,	which	we	are	apt	to	consider	as	of	very	trifling	importance,	
may	 thus	 be	 acted	 on.	 When	 we	 see	 leaf-eating	 insects	 green,	 and	 bark-feeders	mottled-grey;	 the	 alpine	 ptarmigan	 white	 in	 winter,	 the	 red-grouse	 the	 colour	 of	heather,	and	the	black-grouse	that	of	peaty	earth,	we	must	believe	that	these	tints	are	
of	service	to	these	birds	and	insects	in	preserving	them	from	danger	(Darwin	1859:	84,	emphasis	added).	Natural	selection	‘acts	upon’	characters	only	in	an	utterly	metaphorical	way,	but	 characters,	 inheritance,	 and	 natural	 selection,	 along	 with	 individual	organisms,	 are	 inseparable	 faces	 of	 the	 same	 phenomenon.	 Color	 is	 a	 real	thing:	a	certain	shade	of	green	protects	a	species	of	leaf-eating	animals,	and	in	this	way	it	prevails	on	other	shades	of	green	and	on	other	hues.	A	character	in	Darwin	has	the	crucial	features	of	being	inherited	and	variable.	We	see	also	the	foreshadow	 of	 the	 population	 genetics	 idea	 that	 a	 character	 has	 a	 fitness.	Darwin	wrote:	I	can	see	no	reason	 to	doubt	 that	an	accidental	deviation	 in	 the	size	and	 form	of	 the	body,	 or	 in	 the	 curvature	 and	 length	 of	 the	 proboscis,	 &c.,	 far	 too	 slight	 to	 be	appreciated	 by	 us,	 might	 profit	 a	 bee	 or	 other	 insect,	 so	 that	 an	 individual	 so	characterised	 would	 be	 able	 to	 obtain	 its	 food	 more	 quickly,	 and	 so	 have	 a	 better	chance	of	living	and	leaving	descendants	(Darwin	1859:	94).	We	 see	 here	 that	Darwin	 had	 a	more	mechanistic	 view	of	 fitness	 than	 the	more	probabilistic	one	that	would	emerge	 later.	Yet,	 the	 idea	 that	one	of	 the	crucial	 dimensions	 of	 a	 character	 in	 evolution	 is	 ‘inter-generational	transmission’	 was	 already	 clear.	 Work	 on	 inheritance	 and	 evolution	 was	carried	out	after	Darwin,	way	into	the	twentieth	century,	and	resulted	 in	the	construction	of	a	powerful	mathematical,	statistical	body	of	theory	that	is	still	with	us	today,	centered	on	a	mathematical	object	called	Mendelian	population.	
11.2.1	Galton	William	 Provine	 in	 his	 classic	 book	 The	 Origins	 of	 Theoretical	 Population	
Genetics	(1971)	tells	the	story	of	how	the	issue	of	inheritance	was	addressed	after	 Darwin.	 The	 story	 begins	 with	 Francis	 Galton,	 who	 was	 not	 at	 all	convinced	of	Darwin’s	theory	of	inheritance,	i.e.	‘pangenesis’	(1869).	Galton,	in	trying	 to	 demonstrate	 his	 own	 theory	 of	 inheritance,	 invented	 regression	
analysis,	 a	 mathematical	 method	 that	 became	 perhaps	 the	 first	 tool	 in	 the	evolutionary	 genetics	 body	 of	 theory.	 Galton’s	 methods	 are	 still	 used	 today	(Hartl	&	Clark	2007),	although	interestingly	disconnected	by	most	of	his	ideas.	For	example,	Galton’s	saw	his	own	methods	as	endorsing	his	anti-Darwinian	idea	 of	 evolution	 ‘by	 jumps’;	 moreover,	 his	 hypothesis	 that	 “genius	 was	 a	hereditary	 trait”	 (1869)	 fell	 squarely	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 foundation	 of	human	 eugenics,	 an	 extremely	 controversial	 idea	 (and	 later,	 a	 practice)	entangled	 with	 ideologies	 and	 tragedies	 in	 history.4	Still,	 as	 Provine	 says,	 if	some	of	Galton’s	derivations	and	positions	were	questionable	on	empirical	as	well	 as	 on	 philosophical	 grounds,	 “he	 nevertheless	 opened	 the	 door	 to	 a	
																																								 																					4	Connection:	see	Chapter	4	for	some	more	hints	on	eugenics.	
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statistical	analysis	of	correlations	of	characters,	an	analysis	which	was	to	have	immense	influence	upon	evolutionary	thought”	(Provine	1971:	22-23).	Galton’s	 problem	 was	 to	 model	 the	 transgenerational	 dynamics	 of	 traits	such	as	size	in	sweet	peas,	and	stature,	eye	color,	temper,	artistic	faculty,	and	disease	 in	 humans.	 These	were	 ‘quantitative’,	 as	 opposed	 to	 discrete,	 traits.	Stature	 is	 inheritable	 –	 tall	 parents	 generally	 have	 tall	 children	 –	 but	 is	 not	copied	 identically	 from	one	parent,	 nor	 is	 it	 simply	 the	 parental	mean.	How	are	 parents’	 and	 offspring’s	 stature	 correlated?	 Galton	 measured	 that	 the	stature	 of	 the	 adult	 offspring	 is,	 on	 the	 whole,	 “more	 mediocre”	 than	 the	stature	 of	 their	 parents,	 that	 is	 to	 say,	 nearer	 to	 the	 general	 population’s	median	 (Galton	 1869:	 95;	 cit.	 in	 Provine	 1971:	 20;	 see	 Figure	 11.2).	 This	phenomenon,	valid	 for	all	continuous	characters	studied	by	Galton,	 is	named	
regression,	and	implies,	for	example,	that	offspring	of	extreme	individuals	are	quickly	 brought	 back	 towards	 the	 median	 of	 the	 population,	 more	 so	 the	larger	 the	 parental	 deviance.	 For	 Galton	 this	 implied	 that	 natural	 selection	acting	on	variation	can	“be	of	no	permanent	value	for	evolution,	because	there	is	a	constant	tendency	in	the	offspring	to	‘regress’	towards	the	parental	type”	(Galton	 1869:	 34;	 cit.	 in	 Provine	 1971:	 23).	 No	 cumulative	 change	 through	selection	 was	 possible	 for	 Galton,	 who	 thought	 that	 new	 characters	 in	evolution	only	emerge	as	as	new	complexes	in	equilibrium	–	called	 ‘sports’	–	not	subject	to	regression.	“Types	of	intelligence”,	for	example,	were	explained	in	this	way	(Galton	1869).	
Figure	11.2.	HERE.	
11.2.2	Statistics,	Biometrics,	and	Mendelism	Provine’s	famous	reconstruction	proceeds,	after	Darwin	and	Galton,	with	the	rediscovery	 of	 Mendel’s	 work	 in	 1900,	 and	 with	 the	 consequent,	 all-British	intellectual	battle	between	so-called	Mendelians	and	Biometricians,	 featuring	scientists	 such	 as	 Karl	 Pearson,	 W.F.R.	 Weldon	 and	 William	 Bateson.	 The	parties	 were	 linked	 by	 “the	 study	 of	 variation	 as	 the	 key	 to	 unresolved	problems	in	evolution”	(Provine	1971:	38).	From	several	aspects	of	the	story,	one	 is	 tempted	 to	 frame	 the	 conflict	 as	 one	 between	 scientists	 who	 knew	mathematics	and	others	who	didn’t	know	or	value	it.	Whether	this	is	the	case	or	not,	views	and	methods	provided	by	biometricians	were	to	survive,	suitably	incorporated	into	the	later	mathematized	theory	of	evolutionary	genetics.	Weldon,	a	prominent	biometrician,	wrote	this	telling	aphorism:	“It	cannot	be	too	 strongly	 urged	 that	 the	 problem	 of	 animal	 evolution	 is	 essentially	 a	statistical	problem”	 (Weldon	1893:	329;	 cit.	 in	Provine	1971:	31).	And	 later,	he	wrote	 that	 “the	 questions	 raised	 by	 the	Darwinian	hypothesis	 are	 purely	statistical,	 and	 the	 statistical	 method	 is	 the	 only	 one	 at	 present	 obvious	 by	which	that	hypothesis	can	be	experimentally	checked”	(Weldon	1895:	380-1,	cit.	 in	 Provine	 1971:	 49).	 Weldon,	 working	 directly	 with	 Galton,	 developed	Galton’s	methods	 to	address	 the	amount	of	 interrelation	between	characters	
within	 an	 individual,	 thus	 introducing	 the	 correlation	 coefficient,	 a	fundamental	 feature	 of	 evolution.	 Weldon	 also	 had	 Pearson	 working	 on	 a	problem	 of	 characters	 distribution	 in	 the	 shore	 crab.	 In	 such	 animal,	 all	characters	had	normal	distributions	except	one:	 the	 relative	 frontal	breadth.	With	 the	method	of	moments	 for	 fitting	 a	 theorerical	 curve	 to	 observational	data,	 Pearson	 uncovered	 dimorphism	 of	 frontal	 breadth,	 signaling	 the	presence	 of	 two	 distinct	 races	 in	 the	 crab.	 The	 statistical	 methods	 used	 by	Pearson	and	Weldon,	although	developed	from	Galton’s,	countered	his	view	of	
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evolution:	they	were	particularly	suited	for	the	study	of	continuous	variation	and	 its	 evolution,	 whereas	 Galton	 had	 emphasized	 sports.	 According	 to	Provine,	 for	Pearson	and	Weldon	Galton	had	“simply	misinterpreted	his	own	valid	 methods”	 (Provine	 1971:	 34).	 This	 story	 illustrates	 several	epistemological	 peculiarities	 of	 mathematized	 science.	 For	 example,	sometimes	 a	 law	 can	 get	 to	 be	 interpreted	 in	 a	 radically	 new	 way,	 while	remaining	mathematically	 the	 same.	 This	 happened	 in	 1898,	 when	 Pearson	corrected	 and	 revised	 Galton’s	 “law	 of	 ancestral	 heredity”	 (Galton	 1897)	quantifying	 the	 contribution	 of	 each	 past	 generation	 to	 the	 heritage	 of	 the	current	one.	Pearson	made	 the	 law	consistent	with	Darwinian	selection,	and	was	even	praised	by	Galton	for	doing	that.	These	statisticians	and	statistically-inclined	 biologists	 like	 Weldon	 and	 Pearson	 were	 “Darwinists”	 as	 well	 as	continuists,	 for	 their	belief	 in	 the	effectiveness	of	natural	 selection.	Opposite	positions	were	held	and	strongly	defended	by	the	Mendelian,	William	Bateson,	who	was	convinced	of	Galton’s	dichotomous	view	of	variation,	combined	with	the	discrete	nature	of	the	characters	studied	by	Mendel:	although	continuous	variation	was	actually	there,	the	major	source	of	novelties	in	evolution	had	to	be	 something	 else.	 For	 Bateson,	 the	 source	 of	 innovation	was	 hybridization	between	 distinct	 variants.	 Bateson	 provided	 biological	 arguments,	 and	 it	 is	true	 that	 the	 issues	 brought	 out	 by	 this	 controversy	 have	 persisted	 under	different	 forms	 and	 still	 are	 important	 in	 evolutionary	 biology.	 However,	 as	Provine	 notices,	 “Bateson	 never	 became	 competent	 in	mathematics	 –	 a	 sore	point	 in	 his	 later	 controversy	 with	 the	 biometricians”	 (Provine	 1971:	 36).	Mendelians	worked	under	Mendel’s	 idea	 that	characters	depend	on	“factors”	that	 are	 somehow	 transmitted	 from	 parents	 to	 offspring.	 A	 pea	 plant	 has	white	 flowers	 because	 it	 carries	 a	 certain	 two-factors	 combination.	Wilhelm	Johanssen	coined	the	distinction	between	phenotype	(the	type	of	flowers,	e.g.,	“white”)	 and	 genotype	 (the	 particular	 combination	 of	 factors).	 Factors	 from	the	 parents	 will	 “segregate”	 in	 the	 offspring	 and	 their	 recombinations	 will	result	 in	 the	 observed	 variability	 among	 siblings.	 We	 see	 that	 by	 the	 time	Mendel’s	work	on	heredity	was	rediscovered	by	Hugo	De	Vries,	Carl	Correns	and	 Erich	 von	 Tschermak,	 “the	 situation	was	 already	 tense”	 (Provine	 1971:	55).	The	theoretical	dispute	on	whether	evolution	is	continuous	and	driven	by	natural	 selection,	 or	 discontinuous	 and	 realized	 through	 sports	 or	 macro-mutations,	 surrounded	 the	 subsequent	 period	 of	 intense	 experimental	researches	on	heredity.	As	Provine	says,	“by	1918,	primarily	as	a	result	of	the	analysis	of	successful	selection	experiments,	many	geneticists	had	realized	that	Mendelian	heredity	and	Darwinian	selection	were	complementary”	(Provine	1971:	130)	and	that	Mendelian	characters,	mostly	very	small	and	preserved	throughout	crossings,	provided	 the	 variability	 for	 selection.	While	 experimental	 data	 and	 findings	piled	up,	along	with	interpretations	thereof,	mathematical	methods	were	laid	down	 into	 the	 toolbox	 that	 was	 taking	 shape	 and	 that	 was	 to	 become	evolutionary	 genetics.5	Udny	 Yule	 (1903)	 and	 Pearson	 (1904)	 had	 outlined	mathematically	the	possibility	already	grasped	by	Mendel	that	if	two	or	more	pairs	of	factors	are	involved	in	a	phenotypic	character,	the	result	might	be	an	apparently	 continuous	 array	 of	 variations.	 Natural	 selection	 operating	through	 continuous	 variation	 might	 thus	 provoke	 sorting	 of	 the	 involved																																									 																					5	Case	 studies	 surely	 played	 a	 role	 as	 well,	 as	 exemplars,	 in	 the	 toolbox,	 used	 by	 scientists	through	 the	 epistemological	 strategy	 of	 abduction.	 But	 my	 focus	 here	 is	 on	 mathematical	generalizations	rather	than	on	case	studies.	
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alleles.	 Assuming	 random	 breeding	 populations,	 Yule,	 Godfrey	 Hardy	 and	German	 Wilhelm	 Weinberg	 had	 independently	 studied	 the	 equilibrium	frequencies,	i.e.	those	frequencies	that,	once	reached,	are	conserved	due	to	the	mechanism	of	segregation	alone.	In	the	U.S.,	H.S.	Jennings	and	Raymond	Pearl	tried	to	derive	formulas	to	calculate	the	genetic	composition	of	a	population.	H.T.J.	Norton	and	Howard	C.	Warren	had	quantified	the	effect	of	selection	on	a	gene	 under	 different	 conditions.	 With	 the	 celebrated	 systematic	 work	 by	Ronald	 Alymer	 Fisher,	 Sewall	 Wright,	 and	 J.B.S.	 Haldane,	 along	 with	 the	progressive	 demonstration	 that	 Mendelian	 inheritance	 could	 account	 for	observed	 correlations	 (parent-offspring,	 fraternal...)	 and	 for	 observed	responses	 to	 artificial	 selection,	 we	 see	 the	 gradual	 emergence	 of	 a	 logical-mathematical	 object	 –	 the	 Mendelian	 space	 –	 to	 which	 all	 quantitative	considerations	would	apply.	Evolutionary	genetics	was	born.	
11.2.3	The	Mendelian	Combination	Space	The	Mendelian	space	is	probably	the	most	important	object	of	evolutionary	genetics.6	It	 is	a	mathematical	object.	 It	 is	 the	space	of	all	possible	 individual	combinations	given	a	number	of	loci	with	their	correspondent	sets	of	alleles.	It	is	thus	a	combination	space:	an	ordered	collection	of	individuals,	where	each	individual	consists	 in	a	combination,	 i.e.	an	array	of	alleles,	 in	 the	number	of	two	for	each	genetic	locus.	Genetic	loci	are	the	same,	in	number	and	identity,	all	over	the	space:	all	individuals	share	the	very	same	loci,	but	each	individual	is	a	unique	combination	of	 coupled	alleles	occupying	each	 locus.	Conversely,	for	 every	 genetic	 locus	 a	 number	 of	 different	 alleles	 are	 available,	 and	 any	combination	 of	 them	 is	 allowed	 in	 the	 space,	 including	 the	 homozigous	combination	(i.e.,	two	copies	of	the	same	allele	in	a	locus).	At	any	time,	only	a	number	 of	 individuals	 –	 conventionally	 designated	 with	 the	 letter	 N	 –	 are	considered	 existent,	 and	N	 is	 exceedingly	 small	 compared	 to	 the	 number	 of	possible	combinations	in	the	space.	These	N	individuals	are	one	population	at	a	particular	moment,	a	subset	of	the	Mendelian	space.	Individuals	are	sexually	reproducing,	and	reproduction	consists	 in	 the	production	of	novel	 individual																																									 																					6	This	statement	is	a	simplification	and	is	exposed	to	several	criticisms.	For	example,	it	could	be	argued	 that	 the	 Mendelian	 space	 is	 central	 to	 only	 one	 tradition	 of	 population	 genetics.	 For	Lewontin	 (1980),	 population	 genetics	 was	 actually	 split	 into	 two	 fundamental	 “research	traditions”,	each	of	which	based	on	a	“theoretical	structure”	or	“scheme”	with	deep	roots	in	the	history	we	have	told	so	far.	Lewontin	viewed	the	two	traditions	as	dating	back	to,	respectively,	Sewall	Wright	and	Ronald	A.	Fisher.	In	the	latter	–	a	continuation	of	“biometrical	genetics”	(see	11.2.2)	–	everything	 is	dealt	with	 in	 terms	of	phenotype,	while	genes	 “get	 lost	 in	 the	shuffle”,	(Lewontin	1980:	63).	 It	was	Fisher	(1918)	who	showed	compatibility	–	or	even	mathematical	entailment	–	between	the	kind	of	continuous	variation	which	is	found	in	phenotypic	traits	and	the	 distribution	 of	 discrete	 Mendelian	 genetic	 variation	 with	 a	 number	 of	 independent	 loci	(Hartl	&	Clark	2007:	12).	In	this	way,	however,	Fisher	legitimated	the	two	traditions	in	pursuing	
autonomous	 research	 strategies,	 each	 through	 equations	 that	 handled	 the	 continuity	 of	variation	and	change	in	different	ways.	Today,	one	of	the	most	used	handbooks	of	evolutionary	genetics,	by	Hartl	and	Clark	(2007),	avails	Lewontin’s	 idea	of	 the	 two	traditions,	and	shows	a	flourishing	 development	 of	 the	 part	 Lewontin	 called	 Mendelian	 genetics	 (chps.	 1-7).	 Only	chapter	 8	 deals	 with	 “evolutionary	 quantitative	 genetics”.	 In	 this	 theoretical	 structure,	 the	variance	 of	 a	 quantitative	 trait	 is	 partitioned	 into	 various	 components	 representing	 different	causes	 of	 variation.	 Reminiscent	 of	 Galton’s	 work,	 quantitative	 genetics	 describes	 systematic	relationships	between	traits,	across	parents	and	offspring	or	also	within	an	organism.	However,	the	most	promising	results	come	from	merging	the	two	theoretical	traditions.	For	example,	the	response	 of	 a	 trait	 to	 selection	 is	 necessarily	 tied	 to	 genetic	 variation	 affecting	 the	 trait	 (ivi:	397).	Therefore,	while,	 e.g.,	 heritability	 can	be	 interpreted	 in	purely	 statistical	 terms,	with	no	genetic	 contents,	 “if	we	postulate	 that	 there	 are	Mendelian	 genes	underlying	 the	phenotypes,	then	the	genetic	underpinning	allows	us	to	do	more”	(ivi:	403).	
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combinations	in	the	space	by	random	recombination	between	parents.	Every	new	generation	replaces	 the	previous	one,	as	generations	are	conventionally	non-overlapping	 in	 the	 Mendelian	 space,	 but	 the	 composition	 of	 the	 new	generation	depends	on	the	previous.	How	does	a	population	of	N	 individuals	explore	 this	 space	 over	 generations?	 This	 became	 the	 central	 question	 –	definitely,	 a	 non-trivial	 question	 –	 of	 the	 new	 evolutionary	 genetics	 body	 of	theory.	The	 establishment	 of	 a	 research	 community	 and	 tradition	 around	 the	Mendelian	space	allowed,	on	the	one	hand,	for	the	accumulation	of	a	large	and	precious	 knowledge	 base.	 Modifications	 to	 the	 space	 were	 introduced	 to	reflect	 both	 advancements	 in	 computational	 tools	 and	 empirical	 discoveries	(e.g.,	 linkage	 disequilibrium,	 namely	 the	 non-complete	 independence	 of	segregation	between	physically	 contiguous	 loci).	On	 the	other	hand,	one	 can	safely	say	that	the	Mendelian	space	was	nwvwr	known	in	full,	as	all	methods	are	 partial	 and	 require	 several	 layers	 of	 theorization	 and	 statistical	summarization.	 As	 Sewall	 Wright	 had	 noted	 already	 in	 1932,	 a	 Mendelian	space	with	a	realistic	number	of	loci	contains	a	number	of	combinations	that	is	greater	than	the	number	of	protons	 in	the	universe.	How	can	we	know	what	happens	in	such	an	astronomically	huge	space?	For	 comparison,	 take	 an	 extremely	 simple	 abstract	 system	 described	 by	Cavalli-Sforza	and	Feldman	in	a	book	we	will	encounter	again	(1981:	78-84).	The	system	is	composed	by	some	agents,	each	of	which	can	be	in	one	of	only	two	states	H	 or	h.	The	agents	mate	 in	 couples.	Each	couple	necessarily	 finds	itself	in	either	one	of	four	states:	HH,	hh,	Hh,	or	hH.	The	couples	give	rise	to	the	new	 generation	 of	 agents.	 How	 does	 this	 system	 behave	 over	 few	 or	 many	generations?	 Don’t	 try	 to	 answer	 with	 your	 intuition:	 even	 with	 only	 two	agent	 states,	H	 and	h,	 the	 system’s	 dynamical	 behavior	 can	 vary	 very	much	according	to	different	assumptions.	The	graph	in	Figure	11.3	shows	how	fast	or	 slowly	 H	 may	 disappear	 (leaving	 room	 to	 h),	 or	 otherwise	 conquer	 the	whole	 population.	 We	 see	 that	 each	 trait	 has	 a	 trajectory	 in	 evolutionary	genetics,	which	 is	 the	 temporal	 dynamics	 of	 its	 frequency	 in	 the	population,	possibily	 in	 relation	 with	 the	 trajectories	 of	 other	 traits,	 and	 certainly	 in	dependence	from	many	features	of	the	population.	The	graph	gives	a	sense	of	how	many	things	you	should	know	(or	assume)	about	the	system	to	be	able	to	predict	its	dynamics:	the	initial	frequency	of	H,	how	often	the	alternative	types	of	couples	are	formed,	as	well	as	each	kind	of	couple’s	probability	to	have	H	or	
h	 offsprings.	 See	 the	Figure’s	 caption	 for	 some	details.	Deposited	knowledge	about	 this	 abstract	 system	 will	 thus	 include	 at	 least:	 (1)	 a	 whole	 list	 of	
parameters	that	are,	or	can	be,	relevant	to	the	dynamics	of	systems	of	this	kind	(for	 example,	 p0,	 p1,	 p2,	 p3,	 i.e.	 the	 respective	 probabilities	 of	 the	 different	couple	 types	 to	 be	 formed	 at	 each	 generation;	b0,	b1,	b2,	b3,	 explained	 in	 the	Figure	 caption);	 (2)	 ideas	 on	 the	 effects	 of	 different	 configurations	 of	 the	parameters	 onto	 the	 system	 dynamics,	 with	 relative	 weights	 for	 their	importance	 (e.g.,	 population	 size	 has	 great	 effect);	 and	 (3)	 mathematical	
methods,	some	numerical	and	some	probabilistic,	to	statistically	analyze	what	goes	on	in	the	system.	
Figure	11.3.	HERE.	We	are	starting	to	get	a	sense	of	how	much	knowledge	is	promoted	and,	at	the	same	time,	required	by	a	single	simple	model.	Let’s	add	that	evolutionary	genetics	has	 to	derive,	 from	studies	of	 these	simple-but-complex	models,	 the	dynamics	 across	 the	 hundreds	 or	 thousands	 of	 loci	 in	 a	 realistic	 population	
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exploring	the	Mendelian	space.	In	light	of	this	complexity,	the	body	of	theory	accumulated	 around	 the	 Mendelian	 space	 acquires	 a	 huge	 importance:	 the	body	 of	 theory	 is	 a	 fragile	 and	 complex	 ensemble,	 full	 of	 assumptions	 and	theorems,	 but	 it	 is	 the	 unescapable	 way	 of	 accessing	 what	 happens	 in	determinate	kinds	of	systems.	History	 teaches	 that	 one	 good	 reason	 to	 be	 conservative	 and	 to	 go	 with	familiar	mathematical	 systems	 is	 that	 knowing	 the	 behavior	 of	 even	 simple	mathematical	systems,	despite	the	fact	that	they	are	built	by	us,	is	so	laborious	that	it	requires	the	establishment	of	a	community	of	people	that	improve	upon	each	others’	work	for	years	and	decades,	developing	a	knowledge	tradition.	
11.3	 The	Application	of	Evolutionary	Genetics	to	Culture	Evolutionary	 genetics	 is	 a	 mathematical	 body	 of	 theory	 with	 a	 centennial	history.	 In	 the	1970s,	 the	body	began	 to	be	modified	 to	 accommodate	 other	transmission	patterns	than	the	Mendelian	one.	The	occasion	was	provided	by	lactose	absorption,	which	was	playfully	introduced	earlier	in	this	chapter,	and	by	other	empirical	case	studies.	
11.3.1	Cavalli-Sforza,	Feldman,	and	Gene-Culture	Coevolutionary	
Theory	Luca	Cavalli-Sforza	and	Marcus	Feldman	kicked	off	a	collaborative	stream	of	work	in	1973,	taking	cue	from	a	debate	over	the	genetic	basis	of	Intelligence	Quotient	 (IQ).	 They	 built	 mathematical	 models	 of	 a	 new	 kind,	 where	 “the	phenotype	of	a	child	 is	determined	by	the	phenotypes	of	his	parents	and	 the	child’s	genotype”	(ivi:	619).	Studying	the	mathematical	systems	in	which	these	two	transmission	mechanisms	work	together	–	ranging	from	one	extreme,	i.e.,	pure	 cultural	 transmission,	 to	 the	 other	 extreme,	 i.e.,	 pure	 biological	transmission	 –	 the	 authors	 performed	 one	 of	 the	most	 typical	 services	 of	 a	mathematical	body	of	 theory:	 they	had	spelled	out	all	 the	relevant	statistical	measures	that	necessarily	influence	the	outcome,	presenting	them	as	guides	to	empirical	 investigations	 of	 problems	 such	 as	 the	 IQ	 heritability.	 They	concluded	that	“formalization	of	the	contribution	of	cultural	transmission	to	a	trait	is	possible”	(Cavalli-Sforza	&	Feldman	1973:	636,	emphasis	added).	A	dry	and	useful	 review	of	what	 happened	 thereafter	 is	 provided	by	 Feldman	 and	Laland	 (1996).	 A	 new	 branch	 of	 evolutionary	 genetics	 was	 born	 that,	 “in	addition	 to	 modeling	 the	 differential	 transmission	 of	 genes	 from	 one	generation	to	the	next,	incorporates	cultural	traits	in	the	analysis”	(Feldman	&	Laland	 1996:	 453),	 where	 cultural	 traits	 are	 those	 traits	 for	 which,	 in	 the	mathematical	model,	a	different	transmission	mechanism	with	a	whole	set	of	parameters	is	set	up.	Cultural	alleles	are	like	H	and	h	 in	the	model	presented	above	 (Figure	 11.3):	 they	 do	 not	 combine	 in	 pairs	 because	 there	 is	 no	genotype-phenotype	 distinction,	 and	 they	 get	 transmitted	 accordingly.	With	respect	 to	 purely	 Mendelian	 systems,	 systems	 with	 the	 addition	 of	 one	“culturally	 transmitted”	 trait	 are	 more	 complicated.	 The	 possible	combinations	(sometimes	called	“phenogenotypes”)	are	at	least	doubled,	and	the	transmission	mechanisms	 intersect.	Therefore,	very	different	 trajectories	and	stable	equilibria	are	possible	 for	 the	 system.	To	predict	 the	outcomes,	 a	remarkable	extension	of	the	evolutionary	genetics	body	of	theory	is	required.	
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I	 like	 to	describe	 this	expansion	as	an	application	of	 the	body	of	 theory	 to	a	new	domain.7	In	 the	 “body	 of	 theory”	 perspective	 presented	 here,	 cultural	 traits	 were	added	 into	 the	 known	 mathematical	 systems	 because	 this	 was	 elicited	 by	some	situations	the	body	of	theory	ran	into,	and	was	not	prepared	to.	Lactose	absorption	was	studied	thanks	to	the	addition	of	cultural	traits	in	the	models	(Aoki	1983;	Feldman	&	Cavalli-Sforza	1989).	The	formalization	assumed	three	possible	 genotypes	 for	 the	 genetic	 trait	 (AA,	 As,	 and	 aa)	 and	 two	 possible	states	 for	 the	cultural	 trait:	milk	user	and	non-user.	Despite	 the	 fact	 that	 the	genetic	bases	of	lactose	absorption	were	even	less	clear	than	today	(Gerbault	et	al.	2011),	the	studies	were	able	to	explore	–	variable	by	variable,	parameter	by	parameter	–	the	conditions	under	which	the	‘absorption	allele’	does	spread	or	 does	 not.	 From	 the	 lactose	 absorption	 frequencies	 actually	 observed	 in	populations	 across	 the	 world,	 the	 models	 were	 built	 to	 work	 backwards,	evaluating	 the	 conditions	 for	 those	 frequencies	 to	 come	 about.	 Another	interesting	domain	of	analysis	was	the	spread	of	agriculture	(Aoki	1987;	Aoki	et	 al.	 1996),	 where	 the	 researchers	 set	 up	 mathematical	 models	 to	 aid	determination	 of	 the	 demographic	 composition	 of	 the	 “expanding	 wave”	 of	farmers	in	the	Neolithic	(around	12,000	years	ago):	how	many	of	them	were	converted	hunter-gatherers,	and	how	many	were	descendants	of	 farmers?	In	other	words:	was	the	spread	of	agriculture	more	a	demographic	expansion	of	farmers	or	more	a	 conversion	of	hunter-gatherers	 to	 farming?	Several	 other	case	 studies	 are	 reviewed	 in	 Feldman	 and	 Laland	 (1996),	 and	 more	 were	carried	out	later.	As	a	consequence	of	all	this	work,	the	evolutionary	genetics	body	of	theory	became	adjusted	to	a	whole	set	of	new	systems.	A	key	moment	in	the	development	of	the	“gene-culture”	branch	of	the	body	of	 theory	was	Cavalli-Sforza	and	Feldman’s	1981	book,	Cultural	transmission	
and	evolution:	a	quantitative	approach.8	The	 subject	of	 the	book	 is	 said	 to	be	“the	dynamics	of	the	changes	within	a	population	of	the	relative	frequencies	in	the	forms	of	a	cultural	trait”	(ivi:	5).	After	a	long	and	thoughtful	Introduction	that	 justifies	 the	 approach,	 the	 book	 presents	 an	 impressive	 and	 perhaps	unsurpassed	 body	 of	mathematical	methods	 and	 results.	 The	 authors	 adapt	techniques	 from	 all	 over	 population	 genetics	 and	 combine	 them	 to	 study	problems	 in	 the	 framework	 of	 multiple	 transmission	 mechanisms.	 For	example,	they	gather	methods	for	both	discrete	and	continuous	characters.	As	Panebianco	(this	volume)	demonstrates,	Cavalli-Sforza	and	Feldman’s	adapted	framework	 would	 soon	 be	 noticed	 by	 modelers	 in	 economics,	 who	 would	contribute	and	expand	 it	with	 their	mathematical	 skills.	Within	evolutionary	genetics,	 the	 introduction	 of	 cultural	 transmission	 allowed,	 for	 example,	 for	long-awaited	 new	 models	 of	 group	 selection	 for	 the	 origin	 of	 human	cooperation.	 Explaining	 unselfish	 and	 altruistic	 behaviors	without	 infringing	natural	 selection	 once	 seemed	 to	 require	 group	 selection,	 i.e.,	 selection	 of																																									 																					7	Many	philosophers	of	science	have	reflected	on	this	problem.	I	only	cite	one	stimulating	work	by	 Ankeny	 and	 Leonelli	 (2011),	 who	 talk	 about	 the	 changing	 “representational	 scope”	 of	 a	model.	The	representational	scope	 is	distinct	 from	the	“representational	 target”,	 i.e.	 the	 initial	domain	 that	 inspired	 the	 construction	 of	 the	 model.	 The	 scope	 can	 stretch	 in	 unpredictable	ways	as	science	proceeds.	 If	we	take	the	Mendelian	space	as	a	model	 in	the	sense	of	a	“stable	target	of	explanation”	(Keller	2002:	115),	then	culture	will	constitute	an	extension	of	its	original	representational	scope.	8	Connection:	Several	Chapters	and	Sections	of	this	book	rely	on	the	way	of	thinking	developed	from	 Cavalli-Sforza	 and	 Feldman’s	 formal	 approach,	 often	 mediated	 by	 some	 informal	 and	inspirational	books	written	by	Cavalli-Sforza.	See	7.2,	7.3;	12.4;	13.3,	13.5;	15.1;	16.1,	16.2,	16.3;	18.1,	18.3.	
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traits	 because	 they	 are	 good	 for	 the	 group.	 But	 models	 based	 on	 genetic	inheritance	go	against	 the	efficacy	of	group	selection.	Robert	Boyd	and	Peter	Richerson	 (1982;	 1985;	 1989)	 became	 famous	 for	 building	 models	 with	genetic	 and	 “conformist”	 cultural	 transmission,	 in	 which	 group	 selection	became	 strong	 enough	 to	 explain	 the	 evolution	 of	 unselfish	 behaviors.	 By	doing	 so,	 they	 also	 indicated	 a	 way	 for	 evolutionary	 theory	 to	 consider	behavior	as	culturally	transmitted,	as	opposed	to	genetically	determined	as	in	sociobiology	 (Wilson	 1975).9	Further	 mathematical	 innovations	 were	 linked	to	the	work	on	cultural	transmission.	An	example	is	niche	construction,	with	its	proposal	of	modifying	the	models	of	evolutionary	genetics	by	adding	selection	feedbacks	 mediated	 by	 environmental	 impact:	 frequencies	 in	 a	 locus	 may	influence	the	amount	of	a	resource	in	the	environment,	affecting	back	genetic	frequencies	 in	 other	 loci	 (Odling-Smee	 et	 al.	 2003).	 Niche	 construction	selective	 loops	are	particularly	stimulating	when	they	are	applied	to	cultural	traits	that	have	a	deep	impact	on	the	environment,	such	as	farming	(Kendal	et	al.	2011).	
11.3.2	Tinkering	and	Justification	A	half	of	the	process	of	mutual	adjustment	between	a	body	of	theory	and	a	new	domain	of	application	is	thus	the	mathematical	tinkering	performed	upon	the	body	of	theory	to	make	it	more	suitable	to	the	new	domain.	This	tinkering	will	 likely	 go	 through	 a	 phase	 of	 experimentation	 and	 low	 control,	 because	new	systems	are	born	in	the	body	and	new	knowledge	needs	to	be	built	upon	them.	The	evolutionary	genetics	body	of	theory	is	scientific	wealth	that	can	be	invested	 in	 studying	 every	 situation	 that	 happens	 to	 turn	 out	 suitable	 to	 be	modeled	as	a	Mendelian	population,	or	as	a	modified	Mendelian	population,	or	as	 a	 population	 of	 continuously	 varying	 individuals	 with	 an	 underlying	Mendelian	basis.	But	 the	application	of	 a	body	of	 theory	 to	a	new	domain	 is	not	automatically	appropriate.	 It	requires	ad	hoc	definition	of	the	domain.	 In	gene-culture	coevolutionary	theory,	as	Feldman	and	Laland	(1995)	point	out,	“culture	 is	 treated	 as	 shared	 ideational	 phenomena	 (ideas,	 beliefs,	 values,	knowledge)	 that	 are	 learned	 and	 socially	 transmitted	 between	 individuals”	(Feldman	 &	 Laland	 1995:	 453,	 emphasis	 added).	 Treating	 “milk	 use”	 as	 a	cultural	trait	may	sound	strange,	but	here	comes	the	second	half	of	the	mutual	adjustment	 between	 body	 of	 theory	 and	 domain:	 justification.	 A	 strong	justification	for	the	use	of	a	body	of	theory	is	the	identification	of	fundamental	questions	that	will	thereby	have	more	chances	to	be	answered.	In	the	case	of	lactose	persistence,	 the	body	of	 theory	may	be	employed	 to	 collect	data	and	eventually	 constrain	 the	 possible	 courses	 of	 population	 history,	 aiding	historical	 reconstruction.	 Analogously,	 considering	 “farming”	 as	 a	 cultural	trait	allows	 for	 the	body	of	 theory	 to	provide	evidence	 for	either	one	of	 two	possible	 scenarios	 of	 the	 spread	 of	 agriculture	 (conversion	 of	 hunter-gatherers	vs.	demographic	expansion	of	farmers).	Since	Darwin,	a	candidate	trait	in	evolutionary	biology	is	anything	of	which	multiple	 instances	exist	and	get	multiplied,	and	which	is	therefore	able	to	be	shared	among	an	 indefinite	number	of	units.	 If	 I	mean	 to	 treat	 “milk	use”	or	“farming”	 as	 cultural	 traits,	 I	 need	 to	 make	 a	 case	 that	 this	 is	 not	 absurd	according	to	what	we	know	about	culture.	
																																								 																					9 	Boyd	 and	 Richerson’s	 gene-culture	 co-evolutionary	 theory	 was	 hailed	 as	 a	 welcome	alternative	to	sociobiology.	For	an	overview	of	criticisms	to	sociobiology,	see	Driscoll	(2013).	
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Sometimes	 justification	 can	 be	 carried	 out	 by	 collecting	 existing	 studies	where	 suitable	 definitions	 of	 the	 new	 domain	 may	 already	 be	 available.	 As	seen	in	some	essays	of	this	volume,	culture	is	a	case	in	point.	Culture	scientists	are	 not	 completely	 alien	 to	 the	 idea	 of	 “cultural	 traits”.10	Philosophers	 and	‘evolutionary	 epistemologists’,	 primum	 Donald	 Campbell	 (1960),	 must	 be	credited	 for	 early	 intuition	 and	 conceptual	 chopping,	 with	 their	 idea	 that	cultural	variants	undergo	processes	of	 selection	and	drift	 that	are	analogous	to,	 though	distinct	 from,	those	that	operate	among	organic	 forms	and	animal	behaviors.	Case	studies	from	social	psychology	or	archaeology	are	frequently	brought	to	support	the	existence	of	cultural	traits	and	their	trajectories.11	Besides	 general	 justifications,	 there	 are	 context-	 and	 scale-sensitive	justifications:	 while	 treating	 “milk	 use”	 as	 a	 transmitted	 trait	 might	 be	meaningful	 and	 useful	 at	 the	 scale	 of	 population	 history	 –	 where	 it	appropriately	summarizes	some	aggregate	behavior	of	the	population	–	“milk	use”	might	 be	 an	 inconsistent	 unit	 at	 the	 scale	 of	 everyday	 life	 or	 over	 few	generations.	
11.3.3	The	Balance	between	Tinkering	and	Justification	in	Cavalli-
Sforza	and	Feldman,	1981	According	to	the	“body	of	theory”	perspective	presented	here,	evolutionary	genetics	 is	an	extremely	precious	deposit	of	 theoretical	knowledge	revolving	around	 some	 mathematical	 systems,	 such	 as	 the	 Mendelian	 space.	Researchers	working	on	a	body	of	 theory	are	always,	by	essence,	at	work	 to	modify	 the	 body.	 Often,	 they	 are	 inspired	 to	 do	 so	 and	 fueled	 by	 empirical	findings	and	problems.	Evolutionary	genetics	is	certainly	a	case	in	point,	with	its	 constant	 dialogue	 with	 the	 variety	 of	 living	 beings,	 their	 reproductive	systems	and	their	ecological	situations	(Hartl	&	Clark	2007).	At	the	same	time,	
any	situation	where	populations	of	combinations	of	traits	can	be	identified	is	potentially	liable	to	be	treated	by	the	body	of	theory’s	mathematical	methods	and	 solutions	 about	 relevant	 parameters	 and	 predicted	 outcomes.	 History	says	 why,	 since	 the	 1970s,	 workers	 on	 the	 body	 of	 theory	 felt	 the	 need	 to	
incorporate	cultural	elements	into	the	body	of	theory,	yielding	the	creation	of	a	 specific	 branch	 named	 “gene-culture	 coevolutionary	 theory”.	 Subsequent	developments	exemplify	that	a	body	of	theory,	when	applied	to	a	new	domain,	must	 be	 fixed	 and	 adjusted,	 more	 than	 the	 other	 way	 around.	 Also,	 when	evolutionary	 genetics	 started	 to	 deal	with	matters	 such	 as	 dietary	 habits,	 it	certainly	 met	 with	 domains	 that	 had	 long	 been	 conceptualized	 by	 other	approaches:	 culture	 studies,	 anthropology,	 philosophy	 etc.	 When	 a	 body	 of	theory	reaches	a	new	domain,	it	has	to	be	accepted	therein,	and	this	requires	
justifications.	 Some	 justifications	 may	 argue	 for	 the	 epistemic	 value	 of	 the	body	 of	 theory.	 Other	 justifications	 may	 leverage	 on	 the	 presence	 of	unanswered	 questions	 and	 unresolved	 competitions	 among	 scenarios	 in	 the	domain:	does	the	frequency	of	the	lactose	absorption	allele	reflect	the	farming	history	of	a	population?	And	how?	Was	the	“wave	of	advance”	of	the	spread	of	agriculture	 in	 the	Neolithic	made	of	 expanding	 farmer	 families	 or	 converted	hunter-gatherer	groups?	The	tools	from	the	body	of	theory	can	be	proposed	as	solutions	 to	 long-standing	 debates	 and	 to	 open	 problems	 that	 cannot	 be																																									 																					10	Connection:	See	Chapters	2,	3	and	13,	and	several	other	Chapters,	 to	 look	for	 familiarity	of	social	sciences	with	notions	that	resemble	‘cultural	traits’.	11	Connection:	 In	 this	 book,	 see	 Chapter	 7	 for	 psychology,	 and	 Chapters	 15,	 16	 and	 17	 for	archaeology.	
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solved	 by	 other	 means.	 Another	 way	 to	 justification	 is	 the	 adoption	 of	 a	working	definition	of	the	domain	that	makes	it	suitable	for	the	application	of	the	body	of	theory.	If	the	working	definition	is	a	pre-existing	definition,	all	the	better.	 In	 any	 case,	 general	 definitions	 of	 the	 domain	 are	 hardly	 sufficient	justifications:	more	specific	ones	are	often	required	relative	to	the	particular	questions	 and	 scenarios	 at	 hand.	 For	 example,	 concepts	 of	 various	 social	sciences	 that	 resemble	 “cultural	 traits”	 can	 contribute	 to	 justify	 the	employment	 of	 the	 body	 of	 theory,	 but	 why	 can	 “milk	 consumption”	 be	considered	 a	 cultural	 traits	 at	 a	 particular	 scale?	 The	 possibility	 of	 talking	about	cultural	phenomena	as	“traits”	is,	in	fact,	context-	and	scale-sensitive.	A	 masterful	 model	 of	 theoretical	 justification	 is	 the	 long	 Introduction	 of	Cavalli-Sforza	 and	 Feldman’s	 landmark	 book	 on	 evolution	 and	 cultural	transmission	 (1981:	 3-76),	 in	 which	 the	 authors	 work	 hard	 to	 define	 the	domain	 and	 circumscribe	 it	 so	 that	 the	 body	 of	 theory	 will	 be	 acceptably	applicable.	Cavalli-Sforza	and	Feldman	“accept	as	the	cultural	unit,	or	trait,	the	
result	of	any	cultural	action	(by	transmission	from	other	individuals)	that	can	
be	clearly	observed	or	measured	on	a	discontinuous	or	continuous	scale”	(p.	73,	emphasis	 in	 original).	 Traits	 can	 be	 aspects	 of	 “thought,	 speech,	 action	[meaning	behavior],	and	artifacts”	(ivi:	10),	and	their	general	definition	is	the	following:	We	will	 use	 the	 term	 “cultural”	 to	 apply	 to	 traits	 that	 are	 learned	by	 any	process	of	nongenetic	transmission,	whether	by	imprinting,	conditioning,	observation,	imitation,	or	as	a	result	of	direct	teaching	(Cavalli-Sforza	and	Feldman	1981:	7).	Among	learned	traits,	the	applicability	of	the	models	is	further	restricted	to	those	which	are	irreversibly	learned	by	individuals:	Cultural	 transmission	 –	 the	 acquisition	 by	 one	 individual	 of	 a	 trait	 from	 another	individual	–	may	involve	long	and	complex	learning	processes.	These	processes	may	in	practice	 be	 wholly	 or	 partially	 reversible.	 Our	 models	 deal	 with	 traits	 that	 do	 not	change	after	the	process	of	learning	is	complete.	This	can	be	accomplished	by	studying	the	population	at	the	same	age	in	every	generation	–	an	age	at	which	all	individuals	are	mature	for	the	trait	under	study	(Cavalli-Sforza	and	Feldman	1981:	62).	The	 fidelity	 of	 transmission	 is	 also	 important,	 further	 restricting	 the	candidate	 traits	 to	 customs.	 A	 custom	 is	 “any	 behavioral	 trait	 that	 is	transmitted	with	 little	 individual	variation	 […]	custom	 is	always	 the	absence	of	novelty,	which	is	avoided	because	it	is	disruptive	and	costly”	(ivi:	64-65).	Cavalli-Sforza	 and	 Feldman	 also	 proceed	 by	 showing	 general,	 perhaps	unfamiliar	properties	of	the	domain	that	justify	employing	the	body	of	theory.	An	example	is	the	issue	of	randomness	of	innovation.	Since	genetic	innovation	is	 the	 periodic	 origin	 of	 new	 alleles	 by	 random	 mutation,	 defending	 the	plausibility	of	the	application	of	genetic	models	to	culture	implies	a	defense	of	the	 randomness	 of	 cultural	 innovation,	 which	 is	 counterintuitive:	 cultural	innovation	is	evidently	intentional	to	an	important	extent.	Here	Cavalli-Sforza	and	 Feldman	 appeal	 not	 only	 to	 the	 frequency	 of	 literally	 chance	 cultural	innovations,	but	also	to	the	limited	foresight	of	intentional	ones:	the	chance	that	the	innovations	will	prove	truly	adaptive	in	the	long	run	is	not	100%	[…].	 Because	 of	 this,	 and	 because	 some	 cultural	 mutation	 is	 simply	 copy	 error,	 a	significant	proportion	of	new	cultural	mutations	might	be	 truly	 random	without	any	resemblance	of	adaptiveness	(ivi:	66).	
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Another	 issue	 in	 the	 application	of	 the	body	of	 theory	 to	 culture	 is	 that	 of	conceptualizing	 free	 choice	 in	 the	 domain.	 Individuals	 cannot	 choose	 what	genes	they	inherit,	but	they	can	make	cultural	choices.	Here	Cavalli-Sforza	and	Feldman	 introduce	 the	 fundamental	 concept	 of	 cultural	 fitness,	 already	recognized	by	Campbell.	 In	 the	body	of	 theory,	a	 cultural	 trait	has	a	 cultural	fitness	 that	measures	 its	probability	of	acceptance,	 that	 is	 the	probability	 for	each	 individual	 to	 choose	 to	 get	 the	 trait.	 Only	 with	 100%	 probability	 of	acceptance	 it	 might	 be	 said	 that	 individuals	 have	 no	 choice.	 With	 lower	probability,	 each	 individual	 does	 choose,	 while	 the	 overall	 system	 remains	predictable	in	a	statistical	sense.12	What	is	lacking,	as	admitted	by	the	authors,	is	variation	of	acceptance	probability	across	individuals:	“as	a	first	conceptual	approximation	we	 prefer	 to	 think	 of	 cases	 in	which	 it	 is	 relatively	 constant	across	 individuals”	 (p.	 15).	 Individual	 differences	 of	 yet	 another	 kind	 –	learning	 abilities	 –	 were	 deferred	 to	 another	 whole	 book	 which	 apparently	was	never	written:	Another	 volume	 will	 take	 account	 of	 individual,	 inherited	 differences	 in	 learning	abilities.	The	 introduction	of	 individual	differences,	 for	 instance	 in	 capacity	 to	 learn,	requires	 a	 quantification	 of	 some	 classical	 genetic	 concepts,	 such	 as	 “norm	 of	reaction”,	 and	 allows	 us	 to	 make	 predictions	 about	 that	 elusive	 entity,	 genotype-environment	covariance	(ivi:	vii).	Many	other	considerations	are	made	in	the	Introduction	and	in	the	Epilogue	of	 Cavalli-Sforza	 and	 Feldman’s	 book.	 We	 may	 say	 that	 other	 justificatory	works	 that	 would	 follow	 in	 the	 subsequent	 years	 would	 retrace	 its	encompassing	 blueprint.13	On	 the	 other	 hand,	 justification	was	 not	 at	 all	 the	main	part	of	Cavalli-Sforza	and	Feldman’s	book.	The	authors,	firmly	centered	into	 the	body	of	 theory,	pointed	out	 the	modifications	 that	were	needed	and	the	constraints	that	were	in	place	therein.	A	fundamental	idea	to	translate	into	the	 body	 of	 theory	 was	 that	 cultural	 traits	 undergo	 not	 only	 “vertical”	transmission,	 i.e.,	 parents	 to	 offspring,	which	 is	 typical	 of	 genetic	 traits,	 but	also	 “horizontal”	 and	 “oblique”	 transmission,	 involving	 peers	 and	 all	 people	beyond	genealogical	bonds.	Further	distinctions	produced	11	distinct	modes	of	 transmission	 (Cavalli-Sforza	 and	 Feldman	 1981:	 55-60).	 The	 internal	structure	of	“nongenetic”	 transmission	mechanisms	was	crucial,	not	as	much	to	justify	the	use	of	mathematical	models	as	to	figure	out	how	to	build	them.	There	 were	 260+	 pages	 of	 mathematical	 studies	 (ivi:	 77-339),	 divided	 into	“Vertical	 Transmission”,	 “Oblique	 and	 Horizontal	 Transmission”,	 “Multiple	State	 Traits”	 (i.e.,	 traits	 with	 more	 than	 two	 alternatives	 available	 in	 the	population),	and	“Cultural	Transmission	for	a	Continuous	Trait”,	with	results	that	showed	how,	for	example,	sometimes	“cultural	transmission	can	simulate	genetic	 transmission,	making	 it	difficult	 to	separate	them	in	careful	analysis”	(ivi:	9),	or	that	vertical	transmission	is	“more	important	than	anticipated”	(ivi:	76).	 Cavalli-Sforza	 and	 Feldman	 remarked	 the	 importance	 of	 matching	 the	right	 level	 of	 analysis	 to	 the	 right	 mathematical	 method	 (ivi:	 71),	 while	maintaining	 tractability	 (ivi:	 73).	 Different	 parts	 of	 the	 body	 of	 theory	were	dragged	 into	 play	 –	 for	 example,	 discrete	 traits	 vs.	 continuous	 traits	 –	according	to	appropriateness	and	tractability.																																									 																					12	Connection:	This	 concept	of	 choice	 is	 fundamental	 to	models	 in	economics,	 the	 “science	of	choice”,	as	explained	in	Chapter	12.	13	In	fact,	many	major	works	mostly	retrace	Cavalli-Sforza	and	Feldman’s	(1981)	Introduction,	and	pile	up	more	and	more	examples	from	the	social	sciences	on	the	same	blueprint.	
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Cavalli-Sforza	 and	 Feldman	 are	 the	 best	 example	 of	 the	 complex,	 bi-directional	 epistemological	 dynamics	 of	 dialogue	 between	 tradition	 and	innovation,	 linking	older	and	more	recent	 literature	in	evolutionary	genetics.	This	dynamics,	according	to	the	“body	of	theory”	perspective	presented	here,	is	 the	 right	 context	 in	 which	 to	 understand	 the	 mathematical	 studies	 of	evolutionary	genetics	applied	to	culture.		
11.4	 Conclusion:	Minding	the	Balance	and	Recalling	the	
Body	of	Theory	The	mutual	adjustment	process	between	a	body	of	theory	and	a	new	domain	is	twofold:	there	is	mathematical	tinkering	upon	the	body	of	theory	to	make	it	more	suitable	to	the	new	domain,	and	there	is	justification,	explaining	why	and	to	what	extent	the	body	of	theory	can	be	useful	 in	the	new	domain.	We	have	seen	the	balance	between	mathematical	innovation	and	verbal	justification	in	the	 seminal	 book	 by	 Cavalli-Sforza	 and	 Feldman	 (1981).	 There,	 justification	consists	 in	 refining	 an	 acceptable	 definition	 of	 culture	 so	 that	 the	 body	 of	theory	 is	 applicable.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 justification	 highlights	 those	 features	that	 must	 be	 taken	 into	 account	 for	 the	 production	 of	 new	 mathematical	studies,	and	draws	the	boundaries	of	the	sub-domain	where	the	mathematics	can	be	of	any	help.	The	 relative	 proportion	 between	 mathematical	 tinkering	 and	 justification	may	be	a	criterion	to	look	at	current	“cultural	evolution”	works,	too.14	In	some	works,	we	may	find	significant	imbalance	in	favor	of	justification.	These	works	miss	 the	 challenge	 of	 modifying	 the	 body	 of	 theory	 to	 make	 it	 suitable	 to	answer	an	open,	pressing	research	question,	and	they	just	reiterate	arguments	for	 using	 evolutionary	 genetics	 to	 analyze	 culture.	 I	 am	 not	 claiming	 that	mathematical	 innovation	 is	 necessary	 per	 se	 in	 each	 and	 every	 “cultural	evolution”	 work,	 but,	 with	mathematical	 tinkering,	 there	 goes	 awareness	 of	the	existence	and	nature	of	 the	mathematical	body	of	 theory,	 its	growth	and	dialogue	with	domains.	In	fact,	where	justification	is	abundant	and	elaboration	lacks,	 justification	 has	 an	 utterly	 new	 rhethoric	 role	 with	 respect	 to	 the	function	 it	 played	 in	 Cavalli-Sforza	 and	 Feldman:	 it	 delivers	 a	 very	 different	idea	 of	 theory,	 namely	 the	 idea	 of	 a	 theory	 as	 the	 faithful	 and	 exhaustive	description	 of	 a	 domain.	 In	 fact,	 tools	 of	 biology	 are	 advocated	 as	 the	 right	ones,	and	culture	is	presented	as	having	“key	Darwinian	properties”;	a	certain	definition	 of	 culture	 is	 justified,	 reiterated	 and	 enriched	 by	more	 and	more	examples,	against	other	ways	of	understanding	culture	that	are	presented	as	inexact	 and	 less	 productive	 (e.g.,	 Mesoudi	 et	 al.	 2006).	 There	 is	 a	 radical	difference	between	justifying	the	applicability	of	a	body	of	theory	as	a	possible	tool	 to	answer	open	questions,	 and	defending	some	 “new	 theory	of	 culture”.	The	 “body	 of	 theory”	 perspective	 can	 be	 a	way	 to	 describe	 the	 relationship	between	 evolutionary	 genetics	 and	 culture	 that	 more	 properly	 understands	
																																								 																					14	I	am	referring	here	to	books	and	papers	such	as	Boyd	&	Richerson	(1985),	Richerson	&	Boyd	(2005),	 Mesoudi	 (2007,	 2011),	 Mesoudi	 et	 al.	 (2004,	 2006).	 A	 flourishing	 literature	 in	philosophy	 of	 biology	 builds	 arguments	 or	 “dual	 inheritance	 theories”	 to	 hit	 forms	 of	sociobiology	and	evolutionary	psychology	 that	don’t	 take	 cultural	 transmission	 into	 sufficient	account.	A	careful	analysis	is	well	beyond	the	scope	of	this	chapter.	Here,	in	light	of	the	“body	of	theory”	perspective,	I	just	offer	one	possible	criterion	for	analyzing	these	texts:	the	criterion	of	the	proportion	between	justification	and	mathematical	innovation.	
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the	epistemological	mechanism	at	work,	and	brings	evolutionary	genetics	into	healthier	dialogue	with	other	ways	of	studying	culture.	
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Concluding	Remarks	
Removing	Barriers	in	Scientific	Research:	
Concepts,	Synthesis	and	Catalysis	
Emanuele	Serrelli	
So	 what?	 At	 the	 end	 of	 a	 book	 on	 ‘cultural	 traits’	 which	 includes	 20	contributions	from	the	most	diverse	disciplines,	from	cultural	anthropology	to	archaeology,	 from	 psychology	 to	 history	 of	 science,	 from	 economics	 to	musicology,	 from	philosophy	 to	 linguistics	 and	 evolutionary	 genetics…	what	have	we	learned	about	cultural	traits?	Well,	much.	But	perhaps	many	readers	will	 feel	 unsatisfied	 by	 an	 incomplete	 vast	 interdisciplinary	 venture	without	some	 sort	 of	 synthetic	 conceptual	 framework,	 some	 new	 understanding	 of	cultural	traits,	or	at	least	some	good	taxonomy	of	what	is	meant	by	a	cultural	trait,	or	minimally	a	list	of	conceptual	problems.	I	will	devote	a	few	lines	here	to	 an	 analysis	 of	 ‘cultural	 traits’	 as	 a	 putative	 scientific	 category	 emerging	from	 our	 collection.	 But	 I	 need	 to	 make	 clear	 in	 advance	 that	 a	 precise	conceptual	synthesis	is	not	here.	We	have	been	as	thoughtful	as	we	could,	and	we	 have	 tried	 to	 follow	 all	 the	 connections,	 but	 there	 is	 no	 such	 thing	 as	 a	‘magic	 paragraph’	 able	 to	 capture	 such	 interconnectedness.	 Indeed,	 this	concluding	note	is	actually	a	critical	comment	against	what	I	and	Panebianco	see	as	a	hurry	to	close	the	discourse	in	a	given	logical	scheme.	In	Chapter	1,	we	summarized	in	our	words	the	contents	of	all	Chapters,	with	particular	 focus	 on	 what	 the	 authors	 mean	 by	 cultural	 trait,	 and	 on	 some	conceptual	problems	that,	however,	are	much	better	explained	in	the	Chapters	themselves.	 We	 provided	 three	 ways	 of	 navigating	 the	 book:	 spontaneous	interdisciplinary	 links,	 guided	 Connections	 that	 help	 the	 reader	 ‘jump’	between	different	 points	 to	deepen	 concepts	 and	 issues,	 and	 the	 criteria	we	embedded	in	the	Chapters	sequence.	Let	us	review	these	latter	criteria.	A	first	‘block’	 of	 Chapters	 presents	 two	 takes	 in	 cultural	 anthropology	 on	 cultural	traits:	the	first	inviting	generalizing	attempts,	the	second	showing	the	reasons	for	 locality.	 Then	 two	 essays	 show	 how	 societies	 and	 nations	 educate	 their	people,	 explicitly	 and	 implicitly,	 to	 their	 own	 typical	 cultural	 traits	 and	 by	
means	of	 cultural	 traits	 (typical	 institutions	 and	 objects).	 Two	 contributions	address	 the	 psychology	 of	 the	 trait,	 emphasizing	 its	 nature	 of	 ‘evocator’	 of	something	 deeper	 or	 larger.	 Two	 Chapters	 show	 the	 importance	 of	geographical	 meeting	 points	 and	 melting	 pots,	 and	 a	 third	 Chapter	problematizes	the	ideas	of	trait,	of	culture,	of	geographical	map,	and	of	maps	and	 diagrams	 in	 general,	 exposing	 our	 obstinate	 hunt	 for	 ‘origins’.	 Two	authors	demonstrate	the	importance	of	mathematical	models,	the	plurality	of	modeling	 strategies,	 and	 the	 influence	 of	 modeling	 strategies	 on	 ways	 of	thinking,	 and	 two	 more	 essays	 show	 how	 these	 ways	 of	 thinking	 can	 be	applied	 to	 understand	 concrete	 situations	 of	 cultural	 contact,	 between	countries	 and	 between	 generations.	 Three	 contributions,	 revolving	 around	archaeology	 and	 material	 culture,	 show	 how	 lineages	 of	 artifacts	 can	 be	
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traced,	and	what	mechanisms	govern	their	change.	Another	essay	introduces	the	 important	 repository	 and	 historical	 record	 of	 cultural	 traits:	 language.	Three	 more	 Chapters	 formulate	 theories	 of	 ‘why’	 traits	 such	 as	 visual	 art,	aesthetic	 preferences,	 and	 the	 passion	 for	 literature	 exist	 in	 the	 first	 place,	being,	 in	 the	 second	 place,	 domains	 of	 circulation	 of	 cultural	 traits	 such	 as	styles,	preferences,	genres.	‘Synthesis’,	 ‘integration’,	 ‘unification’	 and	 similar	 phenomena	 have	 long	gained	 important	 place	 in	 philosophy	 of	 science.	 Philosophers	 actively	 seek	examples	 of	 interdisciplinary	 and	 inter-field	 ‘coordination’,	 and	 ask:	 how	do	different	 areas	 of	 science	 combine	or	 integrate	 their	 divergent	methods	 and	conceptual	 resources?	What	 are	 the	 limits	 and	 facilitating	 conditions?	There	was	a	time	when	philosophers	reasoned	in	terms	of	“theory	reduction”,	using	conceptual	 analysis	 to	 identify	 the	 most	 fundamental	 theory	 other	 theories	would	 get	 reduced	 to.	 Now	 philosophers	 talk	 about	 theories	 pluralism	 and	mechanisms	 heterogeneity	 (Mitchell	 2003,	 Craver	 2009).	 Yet,	 they	 typically	continue	 to	 see	 conceptual	 analysis	 as	 the	main	 tool	 and	 clarification	 as	 the	ultimate	goal.	Their	urge	for	conceptual	grip	can,	I	claim,	divert	their	attention	away	from	their	own	goal,	and	perhaps	from	the	meaning	of	the	experiences	they	are	studying.	In	 2010,	 philosophers	 Brigandt	 and	 Love	 (2010)	 urged	 philosophers	 to	study	“integration	in	action”	in	order	to	understand	the	nature	and	dynamics	of	 interdisciplinarity.	To	set	a	good	example,	 they	organized	a	meeting	of	20	experts	 in	 different	 fields	 of	 biology	 to	 work	 on	 the	 non-trivial	 concept	 of	‘evolutionary	 novelty’,	 with	 the	 perspective	 of	 a	 time-extended	 research	 on	the	same	topic.	In	biology,	‘evolutionary	novelty’	is	an	elusive	concept	just	like	‘cultural	trait’:	it	is	a	‘false	friend’,	full	of	conceptual	pitfalls.	It	means	different	things	 to	 different	 specialists	 (geneticists,	 morphologists,	 phylogeneticists	etc.),	and	nothing	to	many	others.	How	do	you	delimit	a	novelty?	Is	a	new	gene	a	 novelty,	 even	 though	 it	makes	 its	 carrier	 organism	 only	 slightly	 different?	Sometimes	an	unchanged	gene	in	a	new	context	can	be	much	more	innovative	than	a	new	gene	in	a	familiar	context.	Are	birds’	wings	innovative	even	though	they	are	just	modified	limbs?	Probably	they	are,	but	exactly	at	what	degree	of	modification	 do	 they	 become	 a	 novelty?	 ‘Evolutionary	 novelty’	 can	 be	 a	framework	for	interesting	questions,	or	a	source	of	confusions	and	dead	ends.	During	 the	 2010	 meeting,	 definitions	 were	 elicited,	 and	 participants	 were	stumbling	 and	 striving	 for	 “single,	 unambiguous”	 definitions,	 under	 the	assumption	that	conceptual	clarification	would	have	brought	about	some	kind	of	 “coordination”	 among	 them	 and	 their	 fields.	 Brigandt	 and	 Love’s	 brief	account	 illustrates	 their	 firm	 focus	 on	 concepts:	 philosophers	 hunt	 for	conceptual	 clarification	 as	 a	 priority,	 as	 a	 primary	 and	ultimate	 goal,	 loaded	with	 bright	 scientific	 expectations.	 The	 ‘evolutionary	 novelty’	 concept	 was	considered	 interesting	 just	 in	 it	 being	 the	 focal	 point	 of	 opposite	 conceptual	tensions,	that	were	expected	to	be	solved	in	some	way.	The	concept	was	thus	both	 the	 assembling	 criterion	 of	 a	 20-people	 research	 group	 and	 the	transactional	 object	 in	 the	 group.	To	 the	philosopher’s	 eye,	 concepts	 are	 the	domain-delimiting	 factor,	 and,	 within	 the	 domain,	 they	 are	 the	 positive	 or	negative	 measure	 of	 coordination.	 But	 this	 unconditional	 confidence	 in	concepts	 is	 insensitive	 to	 evidence	 that	 concepts	 are	 often	 followers	 in	scientific	community	processes.	For	example,	 they	are	subject	 to	 fashion	and	to	 economic	 pressures:	 Brigandt	 and	 Love	 themselves	 cite	 workshop	participants	reporting	that	they	used	to	mention	‘evolutionary	innovation’	just	as	 “a	 rhethorical	 device	 in	 the	 process	 of	 grant	 writing”,	 despite	 their	
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conviction	 of	 its	 biological	 unimportance.	 Scientists	 use	 concepts	 they	 don’t	find	useful	in	order	to	set	up	a	research	project	and	get	some	funds,	and	later	they	 are	 forced	 to	 maintain	 that	 same	 troublesome	 word,	 incoherent	 with	their	research	assumptions	–	a	 “semantic	curse”.	Concepts	are	also	cruxes	of	identity	 fights,	 so	 that	 putting	 conceptual	 convergence	 as	 a	 goal	 may	 be	exactly	the	move	that	shuts	up	the	dialogue	(see	the	Mesoudi	et	al.	vs.	Ingold	case	in	Chapter	1).	In	sum,	my	impression	is	that	concepts	are	often	a	way	to	close	rather	 than	a	way	to	open	a	discourse.	The	philosophers’	 insistence	on	concepts	 can	 eventually	 do	 harm	 or	 be	 just	 tangential	 to	 the	 directions	 of	science.	In	search	for	 insights	about	 ‘synthesis’	 in	science,	 I	recently	visited	the	U.S.	National	 Evolutionary	 Synthesis	 Center	 (NESCent)	 in	 Durham,	 North	Carolina.15	I	will	say	something	on	the	more	general	 ideas,	and	then	describe	NESCent	catalysis	meetings.	In	fact,	if	our	book	cannot	absolutely	be	compared	to	 a	 working	 group	 or	 a	 synthesis	 project,	 it	 may	 bear	 some	 similarities	 to	NESCent	catalysis	meetings.		At	NESCent,	synthesis	 is	not	at	all	considered	a	conceptual	phenomenon	 in	the	 first	 place.	 Synthesis	 is,	 first	 of	 all,	 the	 combination	of	data	 collected	 by	many	 people	 working	 in	 different	 ways,	 fields,	 approaches,	 regions	 of	 the	world,	 in	 order	 to	 answer	 new,	 bigger,	 and	 pressing	 research	 questions.	Genomes	 can	 be	 an	 easy	 example.	 Whole	 genome	 sequences	 that	 are	periodically	announced	in	the	news	–	the	human	genome,	the	platyus	genome,	the	 carrot	 genome	 –	 are	 assembled	by	 dozens	 of	 labs	 in	 the	world.	 Genome	data	can	then	be	combined,	for	example,	with	medical	data	which	are	collected	in	a	completely	different	–	but	systematic	–	way.	Further	on,	these	syntheses	can	be	compared	cross-species,	and	so	on.	As	for	cultural	data,	an	example	can	be	seen	in	the	combination	of	linguistic,	cultural,	geographic	world	databases	like	 those	we	 cited	 in	 Chapter	 1.	 Now,	 for	 synthesis	 to	 happen,	 researchers	have	to	be	willing	to	share	and	to	combine	their	data,	seeing	the	advantage	of	doing	 that,	 and	 they	 need	 to	 know	 how	 to	 gather,	 store,	 and	 share	 data	 for	them	 to	 be	 useful	 to	 others.	 In	 other	 words,	 they	 need	 to	 have	 a	 certain	‘culture	of	data’	 (notice	 the	 importance	of	databases	and	 informatics).	To	do	all	this,	researchers	may	need	common	concepts,	but	concepts	are	secondary	and	 instrumental	 to	 answer	 their	 communal,	 new,	 pressing	 research	questions.	In	 2009,	 NESCent	 published	 a	 paper	 formalizing	 the	 ‘synthesis’	 idea	(Sidlauskas	 et	 al.	 2009).	 Question-driven	 data	 synthesis	 is	 the	 fundamental	idea,	but	there	are	actually	four	modes	of	synthesis,	depending	on	the	kind	of	elements	 getting	 combined.	 Multiple	 modes	 can	 coexist	 in	 any	 particular	synthetic	study.	As	 the	genomes	example	shows,	synthesis	does	not	coincide	with	 interdisciplinarity:16	intra-disciplinary	syntheses,	which	are	surprisingly	rare	and	most	needed,	combine	elements	from	multiple	studies.	There	are	also	barriers	to	synthesis,	and	ways	to	overcome	them.	The	 first	 mode	 of	 synthesis,	 Data	 aggregation,	 “reinterprets	 raw	 data	underlying	 prior	 investigations	 to	 answer	 questions	 at	 new	 and	 typically	larger	scales”	(Sidlauskas	et	al.	2009:	873).	While	this	may	look	simple,	in	fact																																									 																					15 	The	 National	 Evolutionary	 Synthesis	 Center	 (NESCent)	 is	 an	 American	 NSF-funded	collaborative	research	center	operated	by	Duke	University,	the	University	of	North	Carolina	at	Chapel	Hill,	and	North	Carolina	State	University	(see	Cunningham	2005,	Sidlauskas	et	al.	2009,	Rodrigo	et	al.	2013).	16	Interdisciplinary	syntheses	exist,	and	they	may	eventually	“erode	disciplinary	boundaries	or	create	new	fields	of	study”.	
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“the	vast	majority	of	data	 supporting	previous	 studies	are	unavailable,	often	because	 the	data	 are	 lost	 or	preserved	 in	 inaccessible	 forms”	 (ivi:	 876).	The	second	mode,	Reuse	of	results,	focuses,	indeed,	on	results	of	other	studies	used	as	 data	 in	 a	 new	 context.	 But	 results,	 too,	 are	 scarcely	 available	 in	standardized	and	compatible	 forms.	These	 two	 first	modes	of	synthesis	both	undergo	 publication	 problems,	 since	 “many	mainstream	 journals	 emphasize	primary	data	 collection	 over	 synthesis”	 (ivi:	 875),	 and	publication	 of	 results	over	 publication	 of	 datasets	 (in	 spite	 of	 the	 fact	 that	 datasets	 demand	 a	remarkable	 number	 and	 degree	 of	 technical	 skills).	 For	 Sidlauskas	 et	 al.,	 to	promote	data	aggregation	and	reuse	of	results	solutions	 are	 reasonably	 straightforward.	 Journal	 editors	 should	 encourage	 the	publication	 of	 synthetic	 datasets	 and	 analyses	 and	 should	 make	 an	 effort	 to	 invite	objective	reviews	from	scientists	who	are	also	engaged	in	synthesis.	The	third	mode	of	synthesis,	Methodological	integration,	“links	two	or	more	methods	 to	 create	 a	 new	 analytical	 pathway”	 (Sidlauskas	 et	 al.	 2009:	 873).	Finally,	Conceptual	synthesis	does	not	resume	elements	from	previous	studies,	rather	 “bridges	 the	 theories	 or	 paradigms	 of	 thoughts	 that	 underlie	 and	motivate	prior	studies”	(ivi:	873).	Obstacles	 to	 synthetic	 research	 lie,	 for	 Sidlauskas	 et	 al.,	 in	 training,	 job	search	and	tenure	evaluation,	grant	review,	publication	policies,	and	language	barriers.	Not	only	should	there	be	a	more	interdisciplinary	early	training,	but	it	 should	 “become	 easier	 for	 scientists	 to	 develop	 skills	 in	 aggregating	 and	reusing	 information	 at	 every	 career	 stage”	 (ivi:	 874).	 Synthesis	 training	will	address	not	only	specific	skills	such	as	software	programming,	but	also	basic	skills:	 “information	 literacy	 (the	 ability	 to	 locate	 relevant	 information	 and	assemble	a	knowledge	base),	statistical	literacy	(understanding	how	statistical	manipulation	affects	data	and	inference),	and	data	literacy	(the	skills	required	to	manipulate	and	present	data)”	(Sidlauskas	et	al.	2009:	874).	The	current	lack	of	training	reverberates	upwards	to	the	level	of	panels	who	evaluate	grant	proposals,	where	a	few	“synthetically	minded	scientists”,	if	any,	are	 present.	 Notice	 how	 the	 “synthetic	 scientist”	 is	 presented	 as	 a	 specific	profile,	 corroborated	 by	 published	 official	 guidelines 17 	that	 still	 lack	incorporation	into	the	hiring	criteria	of	research	institutions.	But	many	points	made	 by	 Sidlauskas	 et	 al.	 concern	 another,	 very	 important	 issue:	 that	synthesis	 can	 never	 ever	 be	 an	 exclusive	 concern	 of	 synthetic	 scientists.	 On	the	 contrary,	 for	 synthesis	 to	 happen,	 all	 the	 scientific	 community	 must	 be	involved	in	it.	Journals	and	funding	agencies	have	their	part	to	do,	by	requiring	“all	data	 to	be	shared	at	 the	 time	of	publication”.	Data	repositories	and	their	hosting	organizations	 should	 standardize	 formats,	develop	vocabularies,	 and	establish	 minimal	 reusability	 requirements.	 Software	 developers	 should	ensure	 the	 longevity	 of	 softwares	 (for	 example,	 by	 using	 software	repositories)	because,	even	when	data	endure,	analyses	cannot	be	repeated	if	tools	 are	 not	 stable.	 In	 fact,	 “technology	 can	 also	 hinder	 synthesis	 if	 a	proliferation	 of	 methods,	 data	 standards,	 languages,	 and	 protocols	 hampers	communication	 and	 interoperability”.	While	 synthetic	 scientists,	 experts	 and	managers	work	at	all	these	levels,	at	the	same	time	“a	culture	of	data	sharing”	has	to	prevail,	along	with	a	different	culture	of	“science	as	a	collective,	rather																																									 																					17	Also	 in	 consideration	 of	 these	 documents	 and	 official	 declarations,	 Sidlauskas	 et	 al.	 are	however	optimistic	that	a	new	cultural	shift	is	leading	synthetic	science	to	receive	more	support	than	ever	(Sidlauskas	et	al.	2009:	874).	
	 23	
than	 individual	 enterprise”.	 Only	 in	 this	 way	 the	 deposition	 of	 data	 can	become	“a	normal	part	of	the	research	flow”,	and	all	other	necessary	changes	can	happen.	For	synthesis	to	happen,	scientific	communities	must	“embrace	a	culture	in	which	sharing	is	normative,	methods	exist	to	be	combined,	and	the	potential	 longevity	 and	 utility	 of	 data	 exceeds	 the	 life	 span	 of	 the	 scientists	that	create	it”	(Sidlauskas	et	al.	2009:	877).	Synthesis	 –	 the	 purposeful	 and	 innovative	 combination	 of	 existing	 data	 –	requires	 specific	 ‘working	 groups’	 and	 meetings	 among	 scientists	 who	concretely	 develop	 the	 common	 project.	 But,	 in	 the	 cultural	 context	 just	described,	 the	ground	needs	to	be	prepared	for	synthesis.	 In	 fact,	sometimes	synthesis	 cannot	 even	 begin	 because	 suitable	 data	 haven’t	 been	 collected	 at	all,	 or	 haven’t	 been	 treated	 in	 systematic	ways	 conducive	 to	 synthesis.	 This	lack	of	preparation	may	affect	particular	questions:	…assembling	existing	data	is	not	enough.	For	many	questions,	it	is	too	early	to	attempt	a	 grand	 synthesis,	 and	 in	 many	 cases	 the	 data	 has	 not	 been	 collected	 in	 the	coordinated	 manner	 needed	 for	 a	 grand	 synthesis.	 A	 mechanism	 is	 needed	 for	networks	 of	 scientists	 to	 form	 among	 scientists	 in	 very	 different	 disciplines	 to	coordinate	their	primary	research	efforts	(NESCent	2004:	5).	Pre-synthetic	 activities	 are	 those	 activities	 that	 potentially	 shape	 the	involved	 people’s	 data	 collection	 activities	 and	 data	 sharing	 practices,	 by	influencing	their	culture	of	data.	Here	come	catalysis	meetings,	which,	as	I	put	forth	above,	can	be	seen	as	a	model	for	our	cultural	traits	book.	In	 chemistry,	 catalysis	 is	 the	 increase	 in	 the	 rate	 of	 a	 chemical	 reaction	 of	one	 or	 more	 reactants	 due	 to	 the	 participation	 of	 an	 additional	 substance	called	a	 catalyst.	 Importantly,	 the	presence	of	 the	catalyst	 lowers	 the	energy	that	 is	 required	 to	 reach	 the	 transition	 state	 of	 the	 reaction.	 A	 foundational	document	of	NESCent	explains	that	catalysis	meetings	“bring	together	diverse	groups	 of	 scientists	 on	 a	 wide	 range	 of	 subjects,	 not	 only	 to	 inspire	 cross-disciplinary	collaboration,	but	to	inspire	the	large	scale	of	scientific	vision	that	can	only	come	from	cooperation	and	coordination”	(NESCent	2004:	2).	Several	themes	 are	 recognizable	 in	 this	 statement.	 One	 theme	 is	 a	 culture	 of	 data,	which	 is	 enclosed	 in	 the	 broader	 theme	 of	 the	 large	 scale	 scientific	 vision.	Another	theme	is	the	generation	of	scientific	collaborations.	Catalysis	meetings	are	 expected	 to	 trigger	 “large	 cooperative	 ventures	 necessary	 to	 collect	
primary	 data	 in	 the	 coordinated	 fashion	 necessary	 to	 synthesis”	 (NESCent	2004:	1,	emphasis	added).	Catalysis	meetings	are	also	specifically	organized	to	attract	and	engage	 fields	 that,	 for	example,	are	distant	 from	informatics	tools	and	 related	 data-collection	 methods.	 As	 Joel	 Kingsolver,	 one	 of	 the	 original	leaders	of	NESCent,	told	me:	we	realized	that	there	are	several	important	fields,	areas,	questions	where	you	are	not	quite	at	that	stage	yet.	You	know	there	is	something	interesting	to	synthesize,	but	you	are	 not	 sure	 of	what	 it	 is,	 or	what	 different	 data	 or	 tools	 are	 available,	what	 actual	focused	research	questions	can	be	addressed	(Kingsolver	2014).	Catalysis	meetings	 are	 also	generators	of	 scientific	 collaborations.	 I	 remark	this	 role	because	 I	 think	 it	 is	 fair	 to	maintain	scientific	 collaboration	distinct	from	the	construction	of	common	data	flows.	The	two	phenomena	don’t	seem	to	 be	 completely	 overlapping,	 although	 tightly	 related.	 Indeed,	 according	 to	my	reconstruction,	catalysis	meetings	at	NESCent	were	never	thought	as	 just	functional	to	motivating	people	to	become	able	to	use	informatic	tools	and	to	start	using	them.	Many	other	kinds	of	scientific	collaboration	are	possible.	
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Catalysis	meetings	are	also	seen	as	a	factor	to	change	the	scope	and	vision	of	primary	 research.	The	NESCent	 foundational	document	 (2004)	 remarks	 that	members	 of	 a	 pilot	 project,	 “By	 dramatically	 increasing	 the	 scale	 of	 their	scientific	 vision	 to	 encompass	 the	 historical	 ecology	 of	 an	 entire	 biota	 […]	quickly	realized	that	this	vision	offered	them	a	chance	to	make	rapid	progress	on	 their	own	scientific	 agendas	as	well	 as	 advancing	 their	 scientific	 careers”	(NESCent	 2004:	 2).	 Along	 this	 line,	 catalysis	 meetings	 were	 aimed	 at	 this	dramatic	 increase	of	 “ambition,	 scale	 and	vision	of	primary	 research”	 (ivi:	 6,	emphasis	added),	even	before	or	in	absence	of	direct	collaboration.	In	sum,	being	in	a	catalysis	meeting	can	lead	to	synthesis,	but	also	to	other	kinds	 of	 scientific	 collaborations,	 or	 even	 “only”	 to	 a	 widening	 of	 scientific	vision	 in	 one’s	 own	 everyday	 research.	 Catalysis	 meetings	 allow	heterogeneous	disciplinarists	to	learn	each	other’s	languages,	to	see	if	they	are	talking	 about	 the	 same	 things,	 to	 understand	 what	 their	 data	 are,	 and	theoretical	 frameworks	are,	 and	 to	ask	whether	 they	can	 identify	 some	clear	questions	 and	 a	 research	 setting.	 If	 not,	 they	will	 be	 anyhow	more	 aware	of	each	other,	recognize	the	others	in	their	expertise,	and	be	curious	about	other	ways	 of	 knowledge.	 It	 is	 clear	 that	 synthesis	 cannot	 be	 demanded	 a	 priori	from	 a	 catalysis	 meeting,	 least	 of	 all	 can	 conceptual	 synthesis.	 As	 current	Director	Allen	Rodrigo	told	me	very	effectively:	if	you	are	bringing	people	 from	different	disciplines,	you	can’t	 just	Skype!	You	really	need	 to	 engage,	 to	 have	 people	 there,	 over	 beer,	 over	 wine,	 talking	 about	 their	differences,	 really	 struggling	 to	 understand	what	 the	 other	 person	 is	 saying.	Maybe	getting	frustrated,	maybe	going	away	and	thinking	“this	 is	rubbish”,	but	then	coming	back	 the	 next	 day	 and	 saying	 “ok,	 now	 I	 think	 I	 understand	 what	 you	 are	 talking	about”.	You	need	that	kind	of	passion	and	energy	and	enthusiasm…	What	we	try	to	do	in	our	catalysis	meetings	is	to	share	those	vocabularies	and	make	those	vocabularies	explicit,	 so	 that	what	was	 previously	 incommensurable	 […]	 between	 two	disciplines	becomes	commensurable:	people	understand	what	 they	are	 talking	about.	That’s	 the	first	step	towards	at	 least	understanding	the	differences	in	different	disciplines.	Now	that	doesn’t	really	solve	the	problem	to	synthesis	because	of	course	if	we	agree	with	what	 Kuhn	 was	 talking	 about	 there	 are	 still	 underlying	 beliefs	 about	 utility,	 about	which	way	science	should	progress,	how	science	should	be	done,	and	those	things	may	still	be	different	enough	that	you’re	not	going	to	reconcile	disciplines.	But	at	least	what	we	try	to	do	is	make	sure	that	people	are	talking	about	the	same	thing	(Rodrigo	2014).	All	 of	 this	 is	 similar	 to	 what	 we	 have	 tried	 to	 do	 in	 our	 ‘Cultural	 Traits’	project.	As	a	final	remark,	I	want	to	get	back	to	the	possible	negative	effect	of	a	philosopher’s	 obsession	 for	 concepts,	 conceptual	 clarity,	 conceptual	summaries,	conceptual	change	and	the	like.	As	Rodrigo	continues:	I	also	feel	that	there	is	going	to	be	some	instances	where	–	because	of	the	differences	in	 beliefs	 about	 utility	 and	 the	 like	 –	 we’re	 never	 going	 to	 achieve	 and	 overall	synthesis.	And	 I	 think	 as	 a	Center	what	we	haven’t	 done	 is	 give	 enough	guidance	 to	accept	 that	 that	might	be	an	outcome,	 that	at	 least	 they	get	people	 talking	about	 the	same	thing	and	knowing	what	they	are	talking	about:	that	might	be	a	good	outcome	in	itself,	rather	than	try	to	force	a	situation	to	a	synthesis	(Rodrigo	2014).	Even	within	 biology,	 and	 even	within	 evolutionary	 biology,	 scientists	who	aim	 for	 synthesis	 like	 Rodrigo	 agree	 that	 we	 shouldn’t	 always	 aim	 for	synthesis,	but	recognize	that	“discordance	and	disagreement	can	be	fruitful	as	well”,	 particularly	 if	 they	 lead	 to	 greater	 understanding	 down	 the	 road.	 The	pressure	 to	 close	 down	 a	 catalysis	 meeting	 with	 some	 kind	 of	 conceptual	outcome	 goes	 against	 the	 goal	 of	 curiosity	 for	 opening	 new	 explorations,	 to	which	concepts	are	often	provisional	and	instrumental.	In	the	project	that	led	
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to	this	book,	and	in	the	book	itself,	we	wanted	to	maintain	‘cultural	traits’	as	a	
key	to	open	 interdisciplinarity,	and	so	 it	worked.	We	see	no	hurry	 to	shut	up	now.	We	showed	that	it	is	possible	to	publish		interesting	things	on	this	topic.	We	removed	some	barriers.	We	gathered	people	in	a	virtual	(and	actual)	room	to	try	to	“make	the	incommensurable	commensurable”.	The	best	continuation	of	 this	 book	 would	 be	 someone	 starting	 scientific	 collaborations	 of	 various	kinds.	And	you,	readers,	may	be	those	who	will.	
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